10 Dirty Wall Street Tricks

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By Barry Ritholtz - February 22nd, 2009, 6:40AM

Another classic Paul Farrell rant — the 10 “dirty tricks” Wall Street lobbyists likely will use to help jump-start a new bull market:

  1. Gridlock helps the rich get richer
  2. No Glass-Steagall revival
  3. Keep rating agencies ‘official’
  4. Limit new derivative regulations, keep ‘shadow banking’ alive
  5. Offload toxic debt into a government-owned ‘bad bank’
  6. Support executive pay limits — in public, anyway
  7. Create accounting standards loopholes
  8. No limitations on SEC hiring
  9. Invest heavily in lobbying
  10. Major PR brainwashing: Yes, yes, a new bull is coming!>

He raises many interesting and valid points; go read the entire angry screed.

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Source:
10 dirty tricks to jump-start a new bull, fast!
How Wall Street lobbyists, PR hot shots will limit reform, brainwash America
Paul B. Farrell
MarketWatch, Feb. 9, 2009

http://tinyurl.com/10-dirty-tricks

Marijuana Inc.

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By Barry Ritholtz - February 21st, 2009, 9:00PM

Inside America’s Pot Industry

44:05

CNBC

Map of the Market: Financials

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By Barry Ritholtz - February 21st, 2009, 3:00PM

Map of the Market via Smart Money:

Financials:

http://www.smartmoney.com/map-of-the-market/

Bloomberg Surveillance Appearance

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By Barry Ritholtz - February 21st, 2009, 2:15PM

Here is yesterday’s slot on Bloomberg radio:

click for iTunes audio:

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The Bloomberg web version should be posted (eventually)

Volcker: Mother of all Financial Crisis in US

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By Barry Ritholtz - February 21st, 2009, 1:15PM

Live! From Columbia University in New York, NY: Economic Recovery Advisory Board Chairman Paul Volcker Speaks (Bloomberg News)

Running time: 7:21

Paul Volcker
Columbia University
February 20, 2009

‘Nationalize’ the Banks

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By Barry Ritholtz - February 21st, 2009, 12:00PM

Very entertaining interview  in the WSJ by former OpEd page editor Tunku Varadarajan, about our boy Nouriel.

What makes it so much better than the run of the mill interview is the personal color that Tunku adds to the interview.

Very readable, quite amusing:

Nouriel Roubini is always dressed in black-and-white.

I have known him for nearly two years, and have seen him in a variety of situations — en route to class at New York University’s Stern Business School, where he’s a professor; over a glass of wine in his boyish loft in Manhattan’s Tribeca; at an academic conference, seated sagely on the dais; at a bohemian party in Greenwich Village, at . . . oh . . . 3 a.m. — and he always, always wears a black suit with a white linen shirt.

And so, in black-and-white he was, earlier this week, when he rushed into the office of Roubini Global Economics, his consulting firm in downtown Manhattan, and offered a breathless apology to this correspondent, who’d been waiting for half an hour. “Really sorry I’m late! Charlie Rose taped for way longer than he said he would.”

Mr. Roubini — a month short of 50 — is in huge media demand, the nearest thing to a rock-star among the economists who hold our fate in their hands these days. The peculiar thing, of course, is that he’s in demand because he specializes in predictions of gloom. (He has earned himself the sobriquet of “Doctor Doom.”) In person, though, he’s anything but a downer.

The man has instant impact on public debate. An idea he floated only last week — that our “zombie banks” be temporarily nationalized — aired first on Forbes.com, where he writes a weekly column. It has evolved, in the space of just a few days, from radical solution to almost received wisdom.

Last Sunday on ABC, George Stephanopoulos asked Lindsey Graham, the conservative Republican senator, what he thought about all this talk of bank nationalization. Mr. Graham said that he wouldn’t take the idea off the table. And on Wednesday, Alan Greenspan told the Financial Times that “it may be necessary to temporarily nationalize some banks in order to facilitate a swift and orderly restructuring.”

Mr. Roubini tells me that bank nationalization “is something the partisans would have regarded as anathema a few weeks ago. But when I and others put it in the context of the Swedish approach [of the 1990s] — i.e. you take banks over, you clean them up, and you sell them in rapid order to the private sector — it’s clear that it’s temporary. No one’s in favor of a permanent government takeover of the financial system.”

There’s another reason why the concept should appeal to (fiscal) conservatives, he explains. “The idea that government will fork out trillions of dollars to try to rescue financial institutions, and throw more money after bad dollars, is not appealing because then the fiscal cost is much larger. So rather than being seen as something Bolshevik, nationalization is seen as pragmatic. Paradoxically, the proposal is more market-friendly than the alternative of zombie banks.”

In any case, Republicans must now temper their reactions, he says. “The kind of government interference in the economy that we saw in the last year of Bush was unprecedented. The central bank — supposed to be the lender of the last resort — became the lender of first and only resort! With our recapitalizing of financial institutions, and massive government intervention in the markets, we’ve already crossed a significant bridge.”

So, will the highest level of government be receptive to the bank-nationalization idea? “I think it will,” Mr. Roubini says, unhesitatingly. “People like Graham and Greenspan have already given their explicit blessing. This gives Obama cover.” And how long will it be before the administration goes in formally for nationalization? “I think that we’re going to see the policy adopted in the next few months . . . in six months or so.”

Good stuff . . .

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Source:
NOURIEL ROUBINI: ‘Nationalize’ the Banks
Dr. Doom says a takeover and resale is the market-friendly solution.
TUNKU VARADARAJAN
WSJ, OPINION: THE WEEKEND INTERVIEW FEBRUARY 20, 2009, 10:59 P.M.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123517380343437079.html

The real crisis? We stopped being wise

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By Barry Ritholtz - February 21st, 2009, 12:00PM

Barry Schwartz makes a passionate call for “practical wisdom” as an antidote to a society gone mad with bureaucracy. He argues powerfully that rules often fail us, incentives often backfire, and practical, everyday wisdom will help rebuild our world. Schwartz studies the link between economics and psychology, offering startling insights into modern life. Lately, working with Ken Sharpe, he’s studying wisdom. Full bio and more links

Dow Jones Industrial Average: Long Term Chart

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By Barry Ritholtz - February 21st, 2009, 10:44AM

David L. Singer takes a look at the Dow Industrials, and says “As ugly as this chart is, it makes me want to be long, for a bounce… (with a stop-loss of course).”

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Dow Jones Industrial Average, 1996-2009
click for bigger chart

While Rome Burns

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By John Mauldin - February 21st, 2009, 9:29AM

When I sit down each week to write, I essentially do what I did nine years ago when I started writing this letter. I write to you, as an individual. I don’t think of a large group of people, just a simple letter to a friend. It is only half a joke that this letter is written to my one million closest friends. That is the way I think of it.

This week’s letter is likely to lose me a few friends, though. I am going to start a series on money management, portfolio construction, and money managers. It will be back to the basics for both new and long-time readers. I am not sure how long it will take (in terms of weeks), but it is likely to make a few people upset and provoke some strong disagreements. Let’s just say this is not stocks for the long run.

And because many of you want some continuing analysis of the current crisis, each week I will throw in a few pages of commentary at the beginning of the letter.

But first, and quickly, I just wanted to take a moment and remind you to sign up for the Richard Russell Tribute Dinner, all set for Saturday, April 4 at the Manchester Grand Hyatt in San Diego — if you haven’t already. This is sure to be an extraordinary evening honoring a great friend and associate of mine, and yours as well. I do hope that you can join us for a night of memories, laughs, and good fun with fellow admirers and long-time readers of Richard’s Dow Theory Letter.

A significant number of my fellow writers and publishers have committed to attend. It is going to be an investment-writer, Richard-reader, star-studded event. If you are a fellow writer, you should make plans to attend or send me a note that I can put in a tribute book we are preparing for Richard. And feel free to mention this event in your letter as well. We want to make this night a special event for Richard and his family of readers and friends. So, if you haven’t, go ahead and log on to https://www.johnmauldin.com/russell-tribute.html and sign up today. I wouldn’t want any of you to miss out on this tribute. I look forward to sharing this evening with all of you.

And now, let’s turn our eyes to Europe.

The Risk in Europe I mentioned last week that European banks are at significant risk. I want to follow up on that point, as it is very important. Eastern Europe has borrowed an estimated $1.7 trillion, primarily from Western European banks. And much of Eastern Europe is already in a deep recession bordering on depression. A great deal of that $1.7 trillion is at risk, especially the portion that is in Swiss francs. It is a story that could easily be as big as the US subprime problem.

In Poland, as an example, 60% of mortgages are in Swiss francs. When times are good and currencies are stable, it is nice to have a low-interest Swiss mortgage. And as a requirement for joining the euro currency union, Poland has been required to keep its currency stable against the euro. This gave borrowers comfort that they could borrow at low interest in francs or euros, rather than at much higher local rates.

But in an echo of teaser-rate subprimes here in the US, there is a problem. Along came the synchronized global recession and large Polish current-account trade deficits, which were three times those of the US in terms of GDP, just to give us some perspective. Of course, if you are not a reserve currency this is going to bring some pressure to bear. And it did. The Polish zloty has basically dropped in half compared to the Swiss franc. That means if you are a mortgage holder, your house payment just doubled. That same story is repeated all over the Baltics and Eastern Europe.

Austrian banks have lent $289 billion (230 billion euros) to Eastern Europe. That is 70% of Austrian GDP. Much of it is in Swiss francs they borrowed from Swiss banks. Even a 10% impairment (highly optimistic) would bankrupt the Austrian financial system, says the Austrian finance minister, Joseph Proll. In the US we speak of banks that are too big to be allowed to fail. But the reality is that we could nationalize them if we needed to do so. (And for the record, I favor nationalization and swift privatization. We cannot afford a repeat of Japan’s zombie banks.)

The problem is that in Europe there are many banks that are simply too big to save. The size of the banks in terms of the GDP of the country in which they are domiciled is all out of proportion. For my American readers, it would be as if the bank bailout package were in excess of $14 trillion (give or take a few trillion). In essence, there are small countries which have very large banks (relatively speaking) that have gone outside their own borders to make loans and have done so at levels of leverage which are far in excess of the most leveraged US banks. The ability of the “host” countries to nationalize their banks is simply not there. They are going to have to have help from larger countries. But as we will see below, that help is problematical.

Western European banks have been very aggressive in lending to emerging market countries worldwide. Almost 75% of an estimated $4.9 trillion of loans outstanding are to countries that are in deep recessions. Plus, according to the IMF, they are 50% more leveraged than US banks.

Today the euro rallied back to $1.26 based upon statements from German authorities that were interpreted as a potential willingness to help out non-German (in particular, Austrian) banks.

However, this more sobering note from Strategic Energy was sent to me by a reader. It nicely sums up my concerns:

“It is East Europe that is blowing up right now. Erik Berglof, EBRD’s chief economist, told me the region may need e400bn in help to cover loans and prop up the credit system. Europe’s governments are making matters worse. Some are pressuring their banks to pull back, undercutting subsidiaries in East Europe. Athens has ordered Greek banks to pull out of the Balkans.

“The sums needed are beyond the limits of the IMF, which has already bailed out Hungary, Ukraine, Latvia, Belarus, Iceland, and Pakistan — and Turkey next — and is fast exhausting its own $200bn (e155bn) reserve. We are nearing the point where the IMF may have to print money for the world, using arcane powers to issue Special Drawing Rights. Its $16bn rescue of Ukraine has unravelled. The country — facing a 12% contraction in GDP after the collapse of steel prices — is hurtling towards default, leaving Unicredit, Raffeisen and ING in the lurch. Pakistan wants another $7.6bn. Latvia’s central bank governor has declared his economy “clinically dead” after it shrank 10.5% in the fourth quarter. Protesters have smashed the treasury and stormed parliament.

“‘This is much worse than the East Asia crisis in the 1990s,’ said Lars Christensen, at Danske Bank. ‘There are accidents waiting to happen across the region, but the EU institutions don’t have any framework for dealing with this. The day they decide not to save one of these one countries will be the trigger for a massive crisis with contagion spreading into the EU.’ Europe is already in deeper trouble than the ECB or EU leaders ever expected. Germany contracted at an annual rate of 8.4% in the fourth quarter. If Deutsche Bank is correct, the economy will have shrunk by nearly 9% before the end of this year. This is the sort of level that stokes popular revolt.

Read the rest of this entry »

No Housing Recovery Before Further Price Declines

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By Barry Ritholtz - February 21st, 2009, 9:03AM

From today’s UP AND DOWN WALL STREET column comes these two charts, which should be quite familiar by now to TBP readers . . . plus a few words on what they mean, via Alan Abelson. They emphasize and repeat our prior assertions that home prices remain way too elevated:

“ALTHOUGH WE’VE ALWAYS BEEN a firm believer that a word is worth a thousand pictures, the two charts adorning this page, we’re forced to admit, provide eloquent and graphic descriptions of why housing still isn’t able to get out of its own way and why there’s still plenty of room on the downside for prices.

We lifted the charts from a recent commentary by our estimable friends at ISI Group. As their respective headlines nicely explain, one shows the ratio of house prices to rents; the other, the median house price divided by median family income.

At a glance, they both relate the same message: House prices are still too high, and not by a modest amount, either. Nor, ISI reckons, will reducing the number of foreclosures, desirable as that may be, halt the erosion in prices. While fewer foreclosures are likely to slow the rate of decline, they won’t reverse the downtrend or determine “where homes prices end up.”

And while the sharp contraction in residential construction of new houses is obviously a plus, the homebuilders, at last report, were still building appreciably more houses than they were selling, and inventories of unsold houses are huge.

But given the remorseless rise in unemployment, which, if anything, is destined to accelerate in the months ahead, the simple fact that so many people are too strapped to afford to buy a home, is, we believe, the most formidable barrier to even a tepid housing recovery.

For that to happen (much less to get a sustained and reasonably robust rebound) will require home prices to suffer a further steep decline, in tandem with a radical improvement on the jobs front.

House prices, in our bloodshot view, have another 20% or so to fall before hitting bottom and, at the earliest, we’re talking sometime next year. And, possibly more important, a meaningful brightening of the current, profoundly bleak jobs picture, isn’t in the cards for certainly as long, if not longer.”

As mentioned on FM, its taken 2 years of housing price declines — and a 25% drop — to get us to the 5th inning or so. From here, another 10% is a modest decline, and another 20% drop, forecast by ISI, is a more significant price drop.

However, these are not worst case scenarios, and I will spare you the details of those, as they are truly sickening.

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Previously:
Residential Real Estate Price Freefall (January 27th, 2009)

http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/01/residential-real-estate-price-freefall/

Homes: Still Too Pricey to Stabilize (February 18th, 2009)

http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/02/homes-still-too-pricey-to-stabilize/

Source:
Double Trouble
ALAN ABELSON
Barron’s FEBRUARY 23, 2009

http://online.barrons.com/article/SB123517396995937201.html

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