Case-Shiller: 2008 Home Prices Hit Record Declines

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By Barry Ritholtz - February 24th, 2009, 9:29AM

Data through December 2008, released today by Standard & Poor’s for its S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, the leading measure of U.S. home prices, show that the prices of existing single family homes across the United States continue to set record declines, a trend that prevailed throughout all of 2007 and 2008.

The decline in the S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index declined 18.2% in Q4 2008 (vs Q4 2007); this was the largest in the data series’ 21-year history.

Year over year, the 10-City Index fell 19.2%, and the 20-City Composite fell 18.5%.

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December 2008 Case-Shiller

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The chart below shows that on a national basis, prices have returned to 2003 levels.

My working presumption is that these are skewed by the foreclosure driven price decreases in 4 areas: California, S. Florida, Las Vegas, and Arizona.

National Home Price Index

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Source:
Nationally, Home Price Declines Closed Out 2008 with Record Lows
S&P, 2009-02-24 09:00:00

http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/CSHomePrice_Release_022445.pdf

http://www.homeprice.standardandpoors.com

What Does Steve Rattner Want?

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By Marion Maneker - February 24th, 2009, 9:19AM

It’s never been a secret that former Lazard leader and Quadrangle founder–not to mention Mayor Bloomberg’s asset manager–has had political ambitions. Early on in the Presidential race, he hitched his wagon to Hillary Clinton’s star in the hopes of becoming Treasury Secretary. Now he’s taking a poorly-defined, low visibility job as an adviser to Larry Summers. That’s dedication. So the question becomes, is Rattner simply determined to carve out a place for himself in the government-financial power structure that will surely grow over the next 4-8 years? Rattner is a canny and far-sighted player. Does this portend a financial mandarinate emerging that will operate the economy from DC? Or is this is sign that alternative asset world’s best days are behind it?

Here’s an excerpt from Rattner’s email announcing the move:

Rattner said he’d “begun a new phase of my life, in the public sector.”

“We are obviously at a critical moment in our nation’s history, particularly with regard to our economy, and I am honored to have this opportunity to serve my country in a meaningful way,” Rattner wrote in the e-mail.

Source:

Quadrangle Picks Steiner, Huber to Run Firm as Rattner Departs
by JASON KELLY and REBECCA CHRISTIE
Bloomberg; February 24, 2009

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=auxPvaTXjHsg&refer=home

Shiller: Stocks Not Yet Cheap Enough for Me

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By Barry Ritholtz - February 24th, 2009, 9:15AM

Yale professor Robert J. Shiller, the author of “Irrational Exuberance,” created one of the most useful and predictive measures of stock-market valuation: the cyclically-adjusted price-earnings ratio (CAPE).

As Professor Shiller explains here, the CAPE mutes the impact of the business cycle by averaging 10 years of earnings. It thus provides a good picture of the market’s value regardless of where we are in the business cycle.

Yahoo, Feb 23, 2009 08:00am EST

Citi View

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By Barry Ritholtz - February 24th, 2009, 8:15AM

Joshua Rosner is Managing Director at independent research consultancy Graham Fisher & Co and advises regulators and institutional investors on housing and mortgage finance issues. Previously he was the Managing Director of financial services research for Medley Global Advisors. In early 2003 Mr. Rosner was among the first analysts to identify operational and accounting problems at the Government Sponsored Enterprises, in the third quarter of 2005 Mr. Rosner identified the peak in the housing market, In October of 2006 Mr. Rosner highlighted the likely contagion from structured securities and credit markets into the real economy.

~~~

Please refer to important disclosures at the end of this report.

Citi View

February 23, 2009
Joshua Rosner
646/652-6207
jrosner -at- graham-fisher.com

Discussions about the stress test continued over the weekend – they were inextricable tied to Citi rumors. We should hear new details this week.

Unfortunately, I expect that the market will find the approaches too complex, to opaque, too reliant on complex instruments and, therefore, too obvious in their attempts to deny the dire reality of the situation – a few large banks won’t be able to survive.

Instead of doing the straightforward thing and getting it behind us, I expect the Administration to continue, a now long tradition, of pushing the problem to another day and thus will allow losses to rise materially even from here. I don’t believe this is done with improper intentions but rather as a result of a lack of personnel with appropriate experience in capital markets and in
resolving bad institutions.

While conversations in Washington and Wall Street are posited as discussions about “the banks”, they continue to ultimately appear to be discussions about Citi. It is true that as Corporate loan losses rise to record levels (I estimate late Q3) and construction loans head that way as well (Q2/Q3), the conversation will be about a few more large institutions. Up to this time, everything we have done seems to have been done with Citi forefront in Treasury’s mind. This only supports the view that our approach should be to get ahead of the curve on the largest and most complex resolutions so we have some experience and so that we have fewer resolutions to juggle 6 months from now.

Unfortunately, all indications are that the government continues to argue that they “can’t dilute the equity holders too much or the companies would never be able to raise capital in the private markets”. Oh, the absurdity… they are toast! They are not going to be able to raise private capital. They need to be cleaned out and resolved. Buyers will always come back to invest in an attractive company with good prospects. Nothing we do, short of resolving and restructuring it, or truly abusing the taxpayer, will ever result in an attractive investment opportunity in a Citi whose prospects are bright.

Then officials say “but if we issue public cease and desist orders to these sick large banks (Citi), as is the regular way to demonstrate a degree of control, it would spook the markets”. Are you kidding, have you looked at where the indices are or where the relevant stocks are trading? The markets are way ahead of policymakers. Only cutting off the head of the beast would calm markets at this point. The faster we demonstrate a willingness to kill the terminally wounded the sooner the viable will begin to trade based on fundamentals and not faulty assumptions.

Addressing Citi is not as complex as people (mostly within the NY Fed and Treasury) argue it is.
Part of the problem is the visceral and gut reaction people have to the word “nationalization”. We must remember that word, like love, means different things to different people. The FDIC ‘nationalizes’ depository institutions every week – they seize them and either do open market sales of the viable
businesses to strategic buyers (sometimes with imputed bridge financing) or they wind down the institution. During this process the law requires a parent holding company to act as a source of strength to its depository.

We could do this with Citi. Yes, it is a larger scale than typical but it is achievable. As a friend said “let the FDIC be the FDIC”. Depending on the capital we need to provide up-front we should expressely wipe out or dilute – on a dollar for dollar basis – the equity, we can then provide 6-9 months of bridge financing which would finance operations while it was being sold off in pieces. We could then begin to auction off business units. As this process unfolds it will become clearer how large the losses will be after considering depositors and secured debt holders. As the process goes on the Company will become smaller and more manageable and investors up the capital structure will have more insight into the value of their preferred or debt investments. Depositors are insured, as are certain debt holders, the government would be wise to say this every time they walk out in public.

There are only a couple of large banks that are likely to find themselves in such a critical condition that they might be handled this way – making the process manageable. If we provided bridge funding to acquirers of some of their units some of those buyers might actually become healthier. Remember, this doesn’t even necessarily mean that the government will replace existing management at this time. Prior to the current, failed, approach to Fannie and Freddie, the managements of those companies rant
them under a very effective consent decree for several years. That is the management template.

I must add that, unlike the usual public process of proposed rulemaking which puts forward and idea and then seeks public comments to be considered and incorporated into the, this Treasury continues in the opaque and secret manner of the last Treasury. They hold secret meetings with select
interested parties, as they are doing today and tomorrow on the modification plan, and thus create an unleveled playing field. More importantly, this approach is precisely the reason that they are not trusted and that the markets are selling off.

Marc Faber on U.S. Banks Nationalization

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By Barry Ritholtz - February 24th, 2009, 7:15AM

Analysis and Discussion with Marc Faber of The Gloom, Boom & Doom Report (Morning Call)


6:28

Bloomberg, February 23, 2009

Citi & BofA Ain’t No Continental Illinois Bank

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By Barry Ritholtz - February 24th, 2009, 6:17AM

In this morning’s WSJ, William Isaac, the 1980s FDIC chair, argues against nationalization of the insolvent mega banks. Isaacs oversaw the nationalization of Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company, and uses that as the basis of his opinion.

Unfortunately, it makes for an awful comparison. In his OpEd, Isaacs overlooks so many dissimilarities between the present situation and that of 1984 so as to render his argument meaningless. Continental has but one parallel to the current situation — it was a large and insolvent bank. On all other counts, the situation was extremely dissimilar to the bailouts circa 2008-09.

We discuss below those differences, but first, let’s see what Isaac has to say:

“People who should know better have been speculating publicly that the government might need to nationalize our largest banks. This irresponsible chatter is causing tremendous turmoil in financial markets. The Obama administration needs to make clear immediately that nationalization — government seizing control of ownership and operations of a company — is not a viable option.

Unlike the talking heads, I have actually nationalized a large bank. When I headed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) during the banking crisis of the 1980s, the FDIC recapitalized and took control of Continental Illinois Bank, which was then the country’s seventh largest bank.

The FDIC purchased Continental’s problem loans at a big discount and hired the bank to manage and collect the loans under an incentive arrangement. We received 80% ownership of the company, which increased to 100% based on the losses suffered by the FDIC on the bad loans.”

The comparisons between 1984 and the present are worlds apart, as are the dynamics between Continental versus Citi or B of A.

Let’s begin with Continental, which went into FDIC receivership in 1984, came out of receivership in 1991, and was ironically purchased by Bank of America in 1994 (their track record of lousy acquisitions goes back decades). Continental went bust due to a fatal combination of an aggressive growth strategy and a very poor purchase of loans from PennSquare. When Penn went bust, it dragged Continental along with it. Isaacs somehow fails to mention that Continental had a rather corrupt senior management, with kickbacks for approving risky loans; some of Continental’s execs ended up doing jail time for fraud.

While management of our current mega money center banks are incompetent and have failed to adequately account for foreseeable risk, no one is alleging that they are criminally corrupt.

Continental was also unique in that it was the very first major bank rescue plan under the concept of “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF). It was novel, a case of first impression, and there were no prior experiences to rely upon. In virgin territory, there was simply nothing in the FDIC playbook to explain how to handle the event.

In its eventual look back at the era, the FDIC wrote that Continental wasn’t Too Big to Fail; rather, it was more accurate to say it was “too big to liquidate.” At present, I know of no serious commentators who are suggesting a Lehman-like liquidation for the mega money centers.

“Regulatory options were also limited by “Continental’s peculiar characteristics: Although very large, it had proportionately few core deposits, no retail branches, and little franchise value.“  (History of the Eighties, Lessons for the Future, page 253).

The two situations couldn’t be more dissimilar. Unlike Continental, Citi and BoA have massive assets, enormous deposits, a huge number of retail branches and extremely valuable franchises. The comparisons between Continental and C/BAC are simply absurd.

Further, any suggestion that these entities become wards of the state indefinitely is not on the table. We are contemplating a very short period of time — months, not years. Not a single person is suggesting a 7 year holding period — that was how long Isaacs and the FDIC kept Continental a government owned entity.

Also insane: While the Continental shareholders were wiped out, all creditors and preferred shareholders came out whole — a ridiculous notion directly subsidized by the FDIC to the tune of $1.6 billion dollars. In the current situation, the idea that creditors, bond holders and preferred shareholders won’t be given a severe haircut is patently ridiculous.

Lastly, politicians in DC are already dictating executive pay, marketing expenses, employee trips, dividend policy advertising sponsorships, etc. These firms have, for all intents and purposes, already been nationalized.

Let’s compare 1984 to the current situation: We have already poured $90 billion into the two big banks, plus agreed to insure another $450 billion in assets. Now compare that to the relative pennies we spent on Continental. Any suggestion these two are remotely parallel is utterly ridiculous.

Continental was the first major bank rescue of the modern era. Since then, we have learned how to accomplish these workouts through the entire savings and loan crisis, along with the Resolution Trust Corporation (the government-owned firm which disposed of failed S&L assets); the subsequent government takeover of the Bear Stearns (immediately flipped to JPM), the 80% nationalization of AIG, the full blown takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; the seamless transition of Wachovia, and Washington Mutual by the FDIC; What is effectively a 75% takeover of CitiGroup and Bank of America.

And that’s before we even get to the current issue of systemic risk, or the drag on the overall economy of having two massive Japan-like zombie banks hanging around. Given that we have already spent 300% of their market caps in terms of capital injections, and are on the hook for another 1500% of their valuations in terms of insured paper, these two banks are becoming vast money pits, ginormous black holes into which vast sums of taxpayers wealth disappear, never to be seen again in this universe.

Former FDIC chairman William Seidman notes that we have not only encourage moral hazard, we have incentivized the banks to keep coming back to Uncle Sam for more cost-free taxpaper money:

“It’s the question of, ‘What’s the best way to get this system cleaned up and going again?’” William Seidman, a former FDIC chairman said in an interview. “In my view, you have to nationalize some of the banks to do that.  The alternative is they’re losing money, they come back to say, ‘We’re too big to fail, we need money.’ They’ll do that every month.”

It would be fair to state that Mr. Isaacs was dealing with a problem of first impression. We have since learned a great deal through trial and error — especially Seidman’s role as first chairman of the Resolution Trust Corporation.Seidman oversaw far greater liquidations and nationalizations than did Isaacs. And at present, the FDIC is liquidating 2 banks per week without any fuss or muss.

Let’s not ignore these hard lessons and experiences for foolish reasons of ideological purity.

>

Sources:
Bank Nationalization Isn’t the Answer
WILLIAM M. ISAAC
WSJ, FEBRUARY 23, 2009, 11:19 P.M.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123543631794154467.html

Continental Illinois and “Too Big to Fail”
FDIC

http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/

http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235_258.pdf#search=’Continental%20Illinois’

Obama Bank Nationalization Is Focus of Speculation
Linda Shen
Bloomberg, Feb. 23 2009

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=anGxzRYhVF_Y&

Now What for the Big Banks?: Interview with Nouriel Roubini

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By Chris Whalen - February 24th, 2009, 6:00AM

Daily Double: Mayer on CDS/Roubini on the Banks

Below is an excerpt from our latest comment.  You can read the entire thing with the  great contribution from Marty Mayer on CDS and our comments on same at American Enterprise Institute yesterday in The IRA.
– Chris
Next we turn to our friend Nouriel Roubini, Professor of Economics at the Stern School of Business, New York University and Co-Founder and Chairman of Roubini Global Economics LLC.

The IRA: First, thank you Nouriel for telling people that we are the top bank analysis shop on the planet. All of us at IRA appreciate the praise. Before we talk about the banks, let’s get some context on the US economy. If you go back several years, even decades, most economists were predicting that our downfall would come as a result of an external shock due to trade and financial flow imbalances. Yet now it seems that the shock has instead come from the financial sector, leveraged to the sky due to derivatives and poor prudential regulation. How do you reconcile the fact that you and many other economists were focused on the trade and current account and did not see the “innovation” coming from Wall Street, the City of London, Paris as a threat?

Roubini: Well, the things we were explicitly worrying about before, like external deficit and trade flows, played a role in how things developed in the financial sector. The immediate causes of the crisis were a series of policy mistakes. The Fed pushed down the Fed funds rate down too low for too long and normalized the rates too slowly. There was poor supervision of the financial sector. There was greed and excessive risk taking within the financial institutions. And there was the poor behavior and conflicts of the rating agencies, who were the enablers of the structure finance bubble.

The IRA: Speaking of monetary policy as a driver of financial excess, there is a really great staff paper entitled “Money, Liquidity, and Monetary Policy,” that was circulated in draft form in January by two FRBNY staffers, Tobias Adrian and Hyun Song Shin. The last paragraph states: “Balance sheet dynamics imply a role for monetary policy in ensuring financial stability. The waxing and waning of balance sheets have both a monetary policy dimension in terms of regulating aggregate demand, but it has the crucial dimension of ensuring the stability of the financial system. Contrary to the common view that monetary policy and policies toward financial stability should be seen separately, they are inseparable. At the very least, there is a strong case for better coordination of monetary policy and policies toward financial stability.”

Roubini: Precisely. If you ask yourself, how were the global excesses able to occur?  In my view the imbalances are a big part of the story, the excess savings from China, Russia, other parts of the world, enabled the US to finance itself cheaply. That build up of the leverage, the excesses, was facilitated by the flows of savings from abroad.

The IRA: So how much of GDP on a global basis and in the US do you think was illusory? That is, how much of the “growth” which we think occurred in the US over the past several years was simply a function of financing proceeds instead of true wealth creation? The losses in financials suggest that we were actually destroying wealth over this period?

Roubini: Certainly the availability of financing from foreign savers to fund American borrowers allowed the excesses to become bigger and last longer. This was a big contributor to the size of the damage in the financial sector. If the US had been a developing country, by 2004 with the twin deficits, you would have had a financial crisis and the bubble would have been deflated sooner. But the fact that the US is not a developing economy, that there was all of this financial innovation, the rest of the world was willing to finance further excess in the US because the had their own surpluses to invest.

The IRA: So the need of foreigners to invest the paper dollars we print in such great supply fuels our financial collapse? Meanwhile gold is trading over $1,000 per ounce.

Roubini: Look, the fact of the cash from abroad allowed long rates to creep in even after the Fed normalized the Fed funds rate. The bond market conundrum that Alan Greenspan referred to was when short rates were being pushed up but long rates were falling. So easy money, easy credit was facilitated by the global financial flows. There is a growing consensus that the Fed by cutting rates from 6 ½ to 1 percent was a mistake and that the normalization process, again, was too long. Even when we get out of this serious recession we’re in now, when the Fed does start to normalize rates, it should happen not over 24 or 36 months but rather over a very short period of time. Otherwise you risk to create another bubble.

The IRA: But let’s take a step back for a moment. We had a conversation with a very experienced loan officer from one of the big banks last week. He described how Sarbanes-Oxley, not the adoption of the mark-to-market accounting rule in 2008, actually was the start of the process of marking down the assets of the US financial system by 25%. M2M reflects the price = value thesis of the Chicago School.  But in the US, we were adopting all of these rules to “add transparency” in the post-Enron world, even as the quality of earnings from banks and other financials was going down the toilet. We were arguing about fair value accounting even as the fundamentals of the US economy were being so badly compromised by financial innovation that accounting just barely matters.

Roubini: Absolutely right. We had fair value accounting and increased transparency at one level. In the meantime you had the process of securitization adding opacity, where you could take a mortgage and sell it to somebody else with no accountability. And then you convert it into an MBS and you slice it and dice it. And then you covert it into a tranches of a CDO of a CDO or a CDO. And then you end up with food chain that produces ever more exotic, non-standardized, illiquid, mark-to-model assets and you end up with a market where there is no transparency. And yes, all the while you hear the politicians talking about increased transparency.

The IRA: Right, so responsibility ultimately rests with the Congress and an unwillingness to govern. When we hear our friends in Europe or Asia ask whether Americans have all lost out minds, you can understand why.

Roubini: We have created a monster. You cannot convert a bunch of doggy “BBB” mortgages using voodoo financing into broadly “AAA” securities because eventually people will panic. That is precisely what we have now. Nobody knows who holds it or how much toxic assets or where, so we have created a monster.

The IRA: But here is the question regarding political economy: Were efforts such as Sarbanes-Oxley and M2M accounting driven by guilt? Did we know, at least passively, that the policies of encouraging regulatory arbitrage via OTC market structures and “innovation” were bad choices, but we still allowed them to continue out of greed? The market economies constantly seem to create our own problems, then over react to them. Maybe that is the way free markets must operate. We seem to teeter from one expedient to the next, without ever addressing the underlying causes. Does this bother you?

Roubini: Yes it does – especially because I support the calls for stronger supervision and regulation.  But I also am painfully aware that the opportunities for regulatory arbitrage are many.

The IRA: Maybe we need to make regulation dynamic instead of giving the industry groups and lobbyists a static target?

Roubini: There are three problems: First, those who innovate are always quicker than those who regulate. As you said, this is a free market. Second there is jurisdictional arbitrage across countries which makes regulation much less effective. And finally there is regulatory capture, where the regulators become advocates for the industry instead of supervisors. In each case, we need incentive-compatible regulation to make it work.

The IRA: To move to the banks, isn’t the silence regarding Basel II deafening? Thirty years of research in financial economics and regulation has been flushed in 24 months. I am still getting comments about our discussion last year with our mutual friend Bill Janeway (‘New Hope for Financial Economics: Interview with Bill Janeway’, November 17, 2008), where he basically said that a new path must be created where we explicitly calculate risk exposures based on real data, not quant shortcuts and guesses using bastard methodology stolen from the physical sciences.

Roubini: Well, many of the major dealers who helped to develop the final Basel II rule have failed before the rule was event fully implemented, so yes you could certainly call that a repudiation. Basel II did not work in the real world of irrational exuberance and regulatory arbitrage.

The IRA: How would you feel about imposing formal professional limits on economists and investment analysts? Any model that is used for either monetary policy or pricing a security must be published and subject to peer and regulatory review.  That is part of several proposals to fix the ratings mess, make them publish their models, put forward by people like Josh Rosner and Sylvain Raynes.

Roubini: Well, the more basic issue is can you model these risks at all?  The internal risk management models upon which Basel II was supposed to be based clearly did not work. You also have seen significant corporate governance problems within financial institutions, as you have written in The IRA regarding Robert Rubin and Citigroup. The compensation system on Wall Street encourages risk taking and, again, reliance on the rating agencies to make asset allocation decisions was clearly another source of instability. And the capital adequacy standards are pro-cyclical as we all know, so every pillar of Basel II has been a failure. I am not sure that simply publishing the models is a sufficient solution.

The IRA:  Agreed.  So, to switch gears, what is your assessment of Obama so far?

Roubini: Well, on the one hand I think you have to give them credit for in less than a month they’ve done three things, however imperfect: they passed a large stimulus package that I large. I am critical of many aspects of the stimulus, but in the absence of a large fiscal package, I think the economy will contract more.

The IRA: So you believe the stimulus package will slow the decline in aggregate demand?  The internal assumptions for transactions like Wells Fargo (NYSE:WFC) and Wachovia having a happy ending depends upon stabilizing the economy by Q3 2009.

Roubini:  Precisely. The second this Obama has done is the mortgage plan. In my view, you must eventually have to reduce the face amount of the mortgages, not merely extend the maturities…

The IRA:  Yeah, as suggested by Jim Crammer on CNBC on Friday, who wants to refinance everyone into 40-year fixed but w/o a principal reduction.  Cramer and the other inhabitants of Bubble Land just cannot get their arms around the notion that the valuations of these securities and the underlying collateral cannot be fixed. The 25% asset haircut for the banking industry that our channel source referred to before equates to a $3-4 trillion loss vs. $13 trillion in total assets and that may not be enough for C, BAC, etc.

Roubini: That’s right and this is why I believe we must see a markdown across the board, for securities holders and mortgagees. And third, on the Geithner plan for the banks, it is true that it was not really a plan and many aspects of it were very disappointing. The market reacted negatively to it not only because it was vague but also because the Administration essentially signaled that we are not going to throw trillions of dollars of good money after bad to bail out the shareholders of the big banks. The market was expecting a bailout and instead they got a stress test. That aspect of the plan, at least, is positive.

The IRA: Thank you. We have been telling people that the word “nationalization” is inappropriate and that the word “restructuring” is more apt. The OCC and the FDIC are going to support these institutions and sell assets for a while, but eventually the bond holders are going to take a haircut. Do you agree? What do we do with the bond holders of the big banks?

Roubini: That is a tough one. In my view, if you don’t treat the bond holders as secured creditors the fiscal costs are huge. If you treat them as traditional creditors, then you run the risk in the minds of some people of further systemic damage a la Lehman Brothers. But my view is that now that the Fed is in the market as counterparty, we are not going to see the fear and panic that existed when Lehman failed. We have to treat the bond holder as a secured creditor and give them a haircut in my view, possibly event convert the creditors explicitly into equity claims. If you take over all of the major banks all at once and restructure them, as you and others have been proposing, I think we minimize the risk of a “creeping” problem going from one bank to the next and therefore we can eliminate a lot of uncertainty. At some point you need to take a decision to deal with all of the insolvent institutions at once and make clear that the institutions that are not resolved are fine and can be saved and made stronger with fresh injections of capital.

The IRA: And thereby give investors finality. Again, we keep reminding people that a happy outcome for WFC, BAC and many other banks depends on arresting the increase in NCLs.

Roubini: Yes. Citi and Bank of America are obviously insolvent today, in my view, especially if you factor in the structured finance exposures. How things turn out for the rest of the industry depends on whether we can slow the decline.

The IRA: The difference between BAC and WFC, and JPM on the other hand, is that Jamie Dimon, who we like more and more, bought WaMu for three cents on the dollar of assets. WFC bought Wachovia whole, without a resolution. So JPM does not have to soft-pedal on foreclosures, despite what you read in the newspaper, and they don’t have to write anything down. WFC and BAC are choking on their acquisitions because they were not restructured first.

Roubini: The same analogy you draw applies to auto loans and whole mortgages and many other asset classes. The way to get these markets moving again is to mark the prices down, take the losses and sell these assets into private hands.

The IRA:  Ditto.  Thanks Nouriel

Questions? Comments? info@institutionalriskanalytics.com

Commodities Outlook – Gold’s Melting Value

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By Barry Ritholtz - February 24th, 2009, 4:30AM

Analysis and Discussion with George Gero of RBC Wealth Management, Featuring Insight with Larry Levin of SecretsofTraders.com (Bloomberg News)


5:29

Bloomberg, February 23, 2009

The Green Revolution

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By Barry Ritholtz - February 24th, 2009, 2:30AM

Analysis and Discussion with Majority Leader Sen. Henry Reid (D) (Starting Bell)

Bloomberg,February 23, 2009

JPM Slashes Dividend 87%

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By Barry Ritholtz - February 24th, 2009, 1:30AM

About time:

“J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. slashed its quarterly dividend late Monday to save $5 billion a year and said that its first-quarter has been “solidly profitable” so far.

Shares of the giant bank climbed 4.7% to $20.42 during after-hours trading. The stock closed down 2% at $19.51 during regular trading.

The quarterly dividend will be 5 cents a share in future, down from 38 cents. That will help J.P. Morgan (JPM) retain $5 billion in common equity a year, bolstering its financial strength in case the recession is longer and deeper than expected.

“Extraordinary times require extraordinary measures,” said Jamie Dimon, chief executive of J.P. Morgan, in a statement. “Our action today is being done as a strong precautionary measure to help ensure that our fortress balance sheet remains intact — even if conditions worsen significantly.”

What the hell took so long?

The entire sector should have ceased dividends the instant they started receiving taxpayer dollars . . .

>

Source:
J.P. Morgan cuts dividend to save $5 billion a year
Alistair Barr
MarketWatch 7:12 p.m. EST Feb. 23, 2009

http://tinyurl.com/jpmdivcut

JPMorgan Slashes Dividend 87% in `Precautionary’ Step to Preserve Capital
Elizabeth Hester
Bloomberg, Feb. 23 2009

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aDh7NR3XwXNA&

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