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	<title>Comments on: Paul Krugman is Wrong About Securitization</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/03/krugman-is-wrong-about-securitization/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/03/krugman-is-wrong-about-securitization/</link>
	<description>Macro Perspective on the Capital Markets, Economy, Geopolitics, Technology, and Digital Media</description>
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		<title>By: spear</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/03/krugman-is-wrong-about-securitization/comment-page-2/#comment-158383</link>
		<dc:creator>spear</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2009 00:09:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=22731#comment-158383</guid>
		<description>im1dc:  Please show me where he said &quot;securitization&quot;.  Warren Buffet&#039;s comments were directly tied to CDS and other derivatives, not securitization.

RE: Remainder who rip on securitization and AAA ratings.  How come this worked for almost 40 years and rarely any problems?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>im1dc:  Please show me where he said &#8220;securitization&#8221;.  Warren Buffet&#8217;s comments were directly tied to CDS and other derivatives, not securitization.</p>
<p>RE: Remainder who rip on securitization and AAA ratings.  How come this worked for almost 40 years and rarely any problems?</p>
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		<title>By: im1dc</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/03/krugman-is-wrong-about-securitization/comment-page-2/#comment-158360</link>
		<dc:creator>im1dc</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2009 23:03:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=22731#comment-158360</guid>
		<description>spear Says:...&quot;RE: Soros. He was referring to CDS and other derivatives. Securitization is not commonly known as a derivative. &quot;

That is not the way I read the article, Soros&#039; comments and securitization not being commonly known as a derivative.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>spear Says:&#8230;&#8221;RE: Soros. He was referring to CDS and other derivatives. Securitization is not commonly known as a derivative. &#8221;</p>
<p>That is not the way I read the article, Soros&#8217; comments and securitization not being commonly known as a derivative.</p>
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		<title>By: im1dc</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/03/krugman-is-wrong-about-securitization/comment-page-2/#comment-158359</link>
		<dc:creator>im1dc</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2009 23:00:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=22731#comment-158359</guid>
		<description>&quot;&quot;My Manhattan Project&quot;

by CalculatedRisk on 3/30/2009 05:02:00 PM

For your reading enjoyment ... here is an article about a software programmer who wrote some of the software for securitizing mortgages.

From Michael Osinski in New York Magazine: My Manhattan Project How I helped build the bomb that blew up Wall Street

    I have been called the devil by strangers and “the Facilitator” by friends. It’s not uncommon for people, when I tell them what I used to do, to ask if I feel guilty. I do, somewhat, and it nags at me. When I put it out of mind, it inevitably resurfaces, like a shipwreck at low tide. It’s been eight years since I compiled a program, but the last one lived on, becoming the industry standard that seeded itself into every investment bank in the world.

    I wrote the software that turned mortgages into bonds

    Because of the news, you probably know more about this than you ever wanted to. The packaging of heterogeneous home mortgages into uniform securities that can be accurately priced and exchanged has been singled out by many critics as one of the root causes of the mess we’re in. I don’t completely disagree. But in my view, and of course I’m inescapably biased, there’s nothing inherently flawed about securitization. Done correctly and conservatively, it increases the efficiency with which banks can loan money and tailor risks to the needs of investors. Once upon a time, this seemed like a very good idea, and it might well again, provided banks don’t resume writing mortgages to people who can’t afford them. Here’s one thing that’s definitely true: The software proved to be more sophisticated than the people who used it, and that has caused the whole world a lot of problems.&quot;

With that as prelude here is what I posted at CalculatedRisk today:

Yea, if only, but the problem is that securitization is flawed precisely b/c it was enthusiastically done to defraud/fool buyers, i.e., not correctly or conservatively.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;&#8221;My Manhattan Project&#8221;</p>
<p>by CalculatedRisk on 3/30/2009 05:02:00 PM</p>
<p>For your reading enjoyment &#8230; here is an article about a software programmer who wrote some of the software for securitizing mortgages.</p>
<p>From Michael Osinski in New York Magazine: My Manhattan Project How I helped build the bomb that blew up Wall Street</p>
<p>    I have been called the devil by strangers and “the Facilitator” by friends. It’s not uncommon for people, when I tell them what I used to do, to ask if I feel guilty. I do, somewhat, and it nags at me. When I put it out of mind, it inevitably resurfaces, like a shipwreck at low tide. It’s been eight years since I compiled a program, but the last one lived on, becoming the industry standard that seeded itself into every investment bank in the world.</p>
<p>    I wrote the software that turned mortgages into bonds</p>
<p>    Because of the news, you probably know more about this than you ever wanted to. The packaging of heterogeneous home mortgages into uniform securities that can be accurately priced and exchanged has been singled out by many critics as one of the root causes of the mess we’re in. I don’t completely disagree. But in my view, and of course I’m inescapably biased, there’s nothing inherently flawed about securitization. Done correctly and conservatively, it increases the efficiency with which banks can loan money and tailor risks to the needs of investors. Once upon a time, this seemed like a very good idea, and it might well again, provided banks don’t resume writing mortgages to people who can’t afford them. Here’s one thing that’s definitely true: The software proved to be more sophisticated than the people who used it, and that has caused the whole world a lot of problems.&#8221;</p>
<p>With that as prelude here is what I posted at CalculatedRisk today:</p>
<p>Yea, if only, but the problem is that securitization is flawed precisely b/c it was enthusiastically done to defraud/fool buyers, i.e., not correctly or conservatively.</p>
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		<title>By: shs28078</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/03/krugman-is-wrong-about-securitization/comment-page-2/#comment-158191</link>
		<dc:creator>shs28078</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2009 16:03:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=22731#comment-158191</guid>
		<description>Can someone explain to me how gain on sale profits gets reversed? Does it come straight out of comprehensive income?  I wonder how much of bank &#039;capital&#039; is retained earnings related to gain on sale profits that have evaporated.  How much has been reversed to date, and how much is left out there ticking???</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Can someone explain to me how gain on sale profits gets reversed? Does it come straight out of comprehensive income?  I wonder how much of bank &#8216;capital&#8217; is retained earnings related to gain on sale profits that have evaporated.  How much has been reversed to date, and how much is left out there ticking???</p>
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		<title>By: usphoenix</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/03/krugman-is-wrong-about-securitization/comment-page-2/#comment-158141</link>
		<dc:creator>usphoenix</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2009 14:10:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=22731#comment-158141</guid>
		<description>@GK: Just so.  

&quot;Risk diversification&quot; was nothing more than &quot;risk concealment&quot;.  Hide lots of bad under a little good.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@GK: Just so.  </p>
<p>&#8220;Risk diversification&#8221; was nothing more than &#8220;risk concealment&#8221;.  Hide lots of bad under a little good.</p>
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		<title>By: Mark E Hoffer</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/03/krugman-is-wrong-about-securitization/comment-page-2/#comment-158113</link>
		<dc:creator>Mark E Hoffer</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2009 12:27:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=22731#comment-158113</guid>
		<description>G.K. Says: 

&quot;Wall Street used mathematicians and indescribably complicated formulae to construct and deconstruct these securities specifically in order to obfuscate the underlying collateral and potential risks. The point, in fact, was complication. You see, if you could construct something that nobody could actually understand, they couldn’t dispute what they were told or what they read in black and white. Then, combined with the vaunted AAA rating + a high yield, and people, in their greed and desire NOT to know, became willing believers. People can understand a whole loan. Not much issue there. But, these securities were designed to be beyond analysis. All you needed to know was that there was a lot of math involved and that there was a AAA rating. That’s it.&quot;

I hope all y&#039;all recognize the Truth when it&#039;s in front of you..b/c G.K. put it, just, there.

as an aside, it explains why the &quot;Champagne Tower&quot; explanation of &#039;how these work&#039; is, really, just so much mordant BS.
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/mordant
try def.#2</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>G.K. Says: </p>
<p>&#8220;Wall Street used mathematicians and indescribably complicated formulae to construct and deconstruct these securities specifically in order to obfuscate the underlying collateral and potential risks. The point, in fact, was complication. You see, if you could construct something that nobody could actually understand, they couldn’t dispute what they were told or what they read in black and white. Then, combined with the vaunted AAA rating + a high yield, and people, in their greed and desire NOT to know, became willing believers. People can understand a whole loan. Not much issue there. But, these securities were designed to be beyond analysis. All you needed to know was that there was a lot of math involved and that there was a AAA rating. That’s it.&#8221;</p>
<p>I hope all y&#8217;all recognize the Truth when it&#8217;s in front of you..b/c G.K. put it, just, there.</p>
<p>as an aside, it explains why the &#8220;Champagne Tower&#8221; explanation of &#8216;how these work&#8217; is, really, just so much mordant BS.<br />
<a href="http://www.thefreedictionary.com/mordant" rel="nofollow">http://www.thefreedictionary.com/mordant</a><br />
try def.#2</p>
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		<title>By: G.K.</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/03/krugman-is-wrong-about-securitization/comment-page-2/#comment-158085</link>
		<dc:creator>G.K.</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2009 04:19:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=22731#comment-158085</guid>
		<description>It looks to me that Krugman and Barry both agree that securitization, as used in the credit bubble years, was far less than ideal.  The question that remains is almost a behavioral one: are humans responsible enough to use these potentially destructive tools in a responsible manner?  Or are humans just too self-interested to act in a way that&#039;s responsible.  In a lot of ways, though, the question is moot.  The irresponsible way in which they were used likely means that buyers will shy away from buying them (absent substantial government support) for a very long time.  

I think some of you are naive.  Wall Street used mathematicians and indescribably complicated formulae to construct and deconstruct these securities specifically in order to obfuscate the underlying collateral and potential risks.  The point, in fact, was complication.  You see, if you could construct something that nobody could actually understand, they couldn&#039;t dispute what they were told or what they read in black and white.  Then, combined with the vaunted AAA rating + a high yield, and people, in their greed and desire NOT to know, became willing believers.  People can understand a whole loan.  Not much issue there.  But, these securities were designed to be beyond analysis.  All you needed to know was that there was a lot of math involved and that there was a AAA rating.  That&#039;s it.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It looks to me that Krugman and Barry both agree that securitization, as used in the credit bubble years, was far less than ideal.  The question that remains is almost a behavioral one: are humans responsible enough to use these potentially destructive tools in a responsible manner?  Or are humans just too self-interested to act in a way that&#8217;s responsible.  In a lot of ways, though, the question is moot.  The irresponsible way in which they were used likely means that buyers will shy away from buying them (absent substantial government support) for a very long time.  </p>
<p>I think some of you are naive.  Wall Street used mathematicians and indescribably complicated formulae to construct and deconstruct these securities specifically in order to obfuscate the underlying collateral and potential risks.  The point, in fact, was complication.  You see, if you could construct something that nobody could actually understand, they couldn&#8217;t dispute what they were told or what they read in black and white.  Then, combined with the vaunted AAA rating + a high yield, and people, in their greed and desire NOT to know, became willing believers.  People can understand a whole loan.  Not much issue there.  But, these securities were designed to be beyond analysis.  All you needed to know was that there was a lot of math involved and that there was a AAA rating.  That&#8217;s it.</p>
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		<title>By: spear</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/03/krugman-is-wrong-about-securitization/comment-page-2/#comment-158017</link>
		<dc:creator>spear</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 29 Mar 2009 21:51:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=22731#comment-158017</guid>
		<description>RE: Soros.  He was referring to CDS and other derivatives.  Securitization is not commonly known as a derivative.  

spigzoine:  Securitization is not lying, it is merely transferring the loan.  Lenders have always sold loans throughout history.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>RE: Soros.  He was referring to CDS and other derivatives.  Securitization is not commonly known as a derivative.  </p>
<p>spigzoine:  Securitization is not lying, it is merely transferring the loan.  Lenders have always sold loans throughout history.</p>
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		<title>By: im1dc</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/03/krugman-is-wrong-about-securitization/comment-page-2/#comment-158014</link>
		<dc:creator>im1dc</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 29 Mar 2009 21:40:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=22731#comment-158014</guid>
		<description>George Soros agrees with my take on securitization not Barry&#039;s &#039;it&#039;s only a tool&#039; metaphor according to my interpretation of:

&quot;Like Warren Buffett, he thinks that the complex financial instruments used by the banks were economic weapons of mass destruction. If anything he expected the tipping point to come earlier. “Everybody who realised that this was unsustainable expected it to collapse much sooner,” he says. “It is so devastating exactly because it took so long.”

The urgent task now, he says, is to realise that the system that collapsed was flawed. “Therefore you can’t restore it. You have to reform it.” He worries that politicians have not yet accepted the need for fundamental change and that “a lot of bankers have their head in the sand”. &quot;

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article5989163.ece

I think Mr. Soros hit the bullseye here.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>George Soros agrees with my take on securitization not Barry&#8217;s &#8216;it&#8217;s only a tool&#8217; metaphor according to my interpretation of:</p>
<p>&#8220;Like Warren Buffett, he thinks that the complex financial instruments used by the banks were economic weapons of mass destruction. If anything he expected the tipping point to come earlier. “Everybody who realised that this was unsustainable expected it to collapse much sooner,” he says. “It is so devastating exactly because it took so long.”</p>
<p>The urgent task now, he says, is to realise that the system that collapsed was flawed. “Therefore you can’t restore it. You have to reform it.” He worries that politicians have not yet accepted the need for fundamental change and that “a lot of bankers have their head in the sand”. &#8221;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article5989163.ece" rel="nofollow">http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article5989163.ece</a></p>
<p>I think Mr. Soros hit the bullseye here.</p>
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		<title>By: Mark E Hoffer</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/03/krugman-is-wrong-about-securitization/comment-page-2/#comment-158012</link>
		<dc:creator>Mark E Hoffer</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 29 Mar 2009 21:40:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=22731#comment-158012</guid>
		<description>spigzone Says: 

&quot;If I sign a mortgage with my local financial institution I should rightly expect...&quot;
&quot;It’s really just that simple.&quot;

spigzone, 

I&#039;ve U$D 100 that says you signed a release of &#039;motgage servicing rights&#039; during your &#039;closing&#039;

remember, Reading Is Fundamental</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>spigzone Says: </p>
<p>&#8220;If I sign a mortgage with my local financial institution I should rightly expect&#8230;&#8221;<br />
&#8220;It’s really just that simple.&#8221;</p>
<p>spigzone, </p>
<p>I&#8217;ve U$D 100 that says you signed a release of &#8216;motgage servicing rights&#8217; during your &#8216;closing&#8217;</p>
<p>remember, Reading Is Fundamental</p>
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