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	<title>Comments on: Why Creditors MUST Suffer Also</title>
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		<title>By: rsouthan</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/04/why-creditors-must-suffer/comment-page-1/#comment-160517</link>
		<dc:creator>rsouthan</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2009 00:10:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=23167#comment-160517</guid>
		<description>I agree that creditors need to bear some of the burden here. Otherwise, we&#039;re encouraging the very behavior that got us in this mess. It&#039;s too bad &quot;too big to fail&quot; has nothing to do with &quot;impossible to fail.&quot; Companies that are too big to fail makes me think of books like The Power of Small - http://tinyurl.com/ddttsp . Nothing is too small to fail, so shouldn&#039;t we be taking a smaller view on things?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I agree that creditors need to bear some of the burden here. Otherwise, we&#8217;re encouraging the very behavior that got us in this mess. It&#8217;s too bad &#8220;too big to fail&#8221; has nothing to do with &#8220;impossible to fail.&#8221; Companies that are too big to fail makes me think of books like The Power of Small &#8211; <a href="http://tinyurl.com/ddttsp" rel="nofollow">http://tinyurl.com/ddttsp</a> . Nothing is too small to fail, so shouldn&#8217;t we be taking a smaller view on things?</p>
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		<title>By: Moss</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/04/why-creditors-must-suffer/comment-page-1/#comment-160085</link>
		<dc:creator>Moss</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2009 16:24:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=23167#comment-160085</guid>
		<description>Graphite-
What theory holds that central planning – whether by Chinese communists or American Democrats – can do a better job of allocating capital than the people who own it?

Reply-
The capital was hijacked by the bankters and others. This mis-allocation is what has caused the mess. 
Efficient use of capital is what market based Capitalism relies on. This basic failure of efficient allocation of capital is what lies at the core of the debate.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Graphite-<br />
What theory holds that central planning – whether by Chinese communists or American Democrats – can do a better job of allocating capital than the people who own it?</p>
<p>Reply-<br />
The capital was hijacked by the bankters and others. This mis-allocation is what has caused the mess.<br />
Efficient use of capital is what market based Capitalism relies on. This basic failure of efficient allocation of capital is what lies at the core of the debate.</p>
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		<title>By: MatB</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/04/why-creditors-must-suffer/comment-page-1/#comment-160071</link>
		<dc:creator>MatB</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2009 15:44:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=23167#comment-160071</guid>
		<description>I thought creditor and counterparty losses were, in aggregate, the systemic risk we were trying to avoid.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I thought creditor and counterparty losses were, in aggregate, the systemic risk we were trying to avoid.</p>
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		<title>By: Graphite</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/04/why-creditors-must-suffer/comment-page-1/#comment-159996</link>
		<dc:creator>Graphite</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2009 06:53:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=23167#comment-159996</guid>
		<description>A fantastic quote from &quot;The Daily Reckoning&quot; on the tension between economic theory and &quot;pragmatism&quot;:

&quot;Everyone wants to be Chinese. Because the Chinese have money. And because they don’t have free markets. It is widely believed that the Middle Kingdom can more effectively fight a downturn without democratic, consensus-driven institutions staying its hand.

But here is where we gasp for air. What theory holds that central planning – whether by Chinese communists or American Democrats – can do a better job of allocating capital than the people who own it?

There is none. That is why the world’s leaders – and most of its economists too – permit themselves a luscious fib; they say they don’t need theory at all. “Pragmatism” was the word on every pair of lips in London this week. Free from chains to dead economists, they say they will try “whatever works.” Oh, the loveable lunkheads! Naïve enough to believe anything; receptive as a trashcan. “Pragmatism” in economics is as phony as the men who preach it. Every one of them has a dog-eared copy of Keynes’ General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money in his briefcase and an ace up his sleeve. And every supposedly new, pragmatic idea they come up with is merely a version of the same quack cures that kept the economy in the hospital last time.

Perhaps you can paint a bridge pragmatically. If you don’t like the color, you can change it quickly. But if you’re building a bridge, an airplane or an economic system, you can’t make it up as you go along. You have to have an idea of how it works before you start. Besides, results from fiscal, monetary and regulatory policies don’t happen overnight. The feedback loop takes years. It took the Bolsheviks seven decades before they realized they’d been had. Friedman’s critique of America’s Great Depression policies didn’t appear until 30 years after the event. In Japan, they still don’t know what they did wrong. And by the time the feds catch on this time, they will have turned an ordinary depression into a great one.&quot;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A fantastic quote from &#8220;The Daily Reckoning&#8221; on the tension between economic theory and &#8220;pragmatism&#8221;:</p>
<p>&#8220;Everyone wants to be Chinese. Because the Chinese have money. And because they don’t have free markets. It is widely believed that the Middle Kingdom can more effectively fight a downturn without democratic, consensus-driven institutions staying its hand.</p>
<p>But here is where we gasp for air. What theory holds that central planning – whether by Chinese communists or American Democrats – can do a better job of allocating capital than the people who own it?</p>
<p>There is none. That is why the world’s leaders – and most of its economists too – permit themselves a luscious fib; they say they don’t need theory at all. “Pragmatism” was the word on every pair of lips in London this week. Free from chains to dead economists, they say they will try “whatever works.” Oh, the loveable lunkheads! Naïve enough to believe anything; receptive as a trashcan. “Pragmatism” in economics is as phony as the men who preach it. Every one of them has a dog-eared copy of Keynes’ General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money in his briefcase and an ace up his sleeve. And every supposedly new, pragmatic idea they come up with is merely a version of the same quack cures that kept the economy in the hospital last time.</p>
<p>Perhaps you can paint a bridge pragmatically. If you don’t like the color, you can change it quickly. But if you’re building a bridge, an airplane or an economic system, you can’t make it up as you go along. You have to have an idea of how it works before you start. Besides, results from fiscal, monetary and regulatory policies don’t happen overnight. The feedback loop takes years. It took the Bolsheviks seven decades before they realized they’d been had. Friedman’s critique of America’s Great Depression policies didn’t appear until 30 years after the event. In Japan, they still don’t know what they did wrong. And by the time the feds catch on this time, they will have turned an ordinary depression into a great one.&#8221;</p>
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		<title>By: 1001</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/04/why-creditors-must-suffer/comment-page-1/#comment-159968</link>
		<dc:creator>1001</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2009 02:37:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=23167#comment-159968</guid>
		<description>“But there is a big hole in these proposals, as there has already been in the government’s approach to bailing out failing financial companies. Even as they focus on firms deemed too big to fail, the new proposals immunize the creditors and counterparties of such firms by protecting them from their own lending and trading mistakes.

100% untrue.......

Treasury&#039;s proposals specifically included a proposed resolution authority for systematically significant finanancial companies like AIG, modelled on the FDIC&#039;s resolution authority. And like the FDIC&#039;s resolution authority for insured banks and thrifts, the Treasury&#039;s proposal gives the FDIC the power to impose pain on creditors—which is exactly what Cowen criticizes the Obama administration for failing to propose! Specifically, the FDIC would have its traditional powers of avoidance, as well as the power to repudiate &quot;burdensome&quot; contracts.

This undercuts Cowen&#039;s entire column. I honestly don&#039;t know how he could have missed this—the proposed resolution authority was the most talked about aspect of Treasury&#039;s proposed financial regulations. What&#039;s even more amazing is that the NYT&#039;s editors let Cowen&#039;s column go to press. I guess they don&#039;t read their own paper.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>“But there is a big hole in these proposals, as there has already been in the government’s approach to bailing out failing financial companies. Even as they focus on firms deemed too big to fail, the new proposals immunize the creditors and counterparties of such firms by protecting them from their own lending and trading mistakes.</p>
<p>100% untrue&#8230;&#8230;.</p>
<p>Treasury&#8217;s proposals specifically included a proposed resolution authority for systematically significant finanancial companies like AIG, modelled on the FDIC&#8217;s resolution authority. And like the FDIC&#8217;s resolution authority for insured banks and thrifts, the Treasury&#8217;s proposal gives the FDIC the power to impose pain on creditors—which is exactly what Cowen criticizes the Obama administration for failing to propose! Specifically, the FDIC would have its traditional powers of avoidance, as well as the power to repudiate &#8220;burdensome&#8221; contracts.</p>
<p>This undercuts Cowen&#8217;s entire column. I honestly don&#8217;t know how he could have missed this—the proposed resolution authority was the most talked about aspect of Treasury&#8217;s proposed financial regulations. What&#8217;s even more amazing is that the NYT&#8217;s editors let Cowen&#8217;s column go to press. I guess they don&#8217;t read their own paper.</p>
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		<title>By: The Curmudgeon</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/04/why-creditors-must-suffer/comment-page-1/#comment-159956</link>
		<dc:creator>The Curmudgeon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2009 01:49:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=23167#comment-159956</guid>
		<description>Froglips Says: 

April 5th, 2009 at 6:09 pm 
Curmudgeon,

I agree, and honestly, I wish the big D happens tomorrow so we can start mucking2 ASAP.
French correction: n’est-ce pas ?

(Thanks for the correction.  French was a long time ago.  I use it nowadays at my own peril.)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Froglips Says: </p>
<p>April 5th, 2009 at 6:09 pm<br />
Curmudgeon,</p>
<p>I agree, and honestly, I wish the big D happens tomorrow so we can start mucking2 ASAP.<br />
French correction: n’est-ce pas ?</p>
<p>(Thanks for the correction.  French was a long time ago.  I use it nowadays at my own peril.)</p>
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		<title>By: philipat</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/04/why-creditors-must-suffer/comment-page-1/#comment-159938</link>
		<dc:creator>philipat</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2009 01:14:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=23167#comment-159938</guid>
		<description>But after the US Government became a subsidiary of Goldman Sachs, such largesse is probabaly inevitable?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>But after the US Government became a subsidiary of Goldman Sachs, such largesse is probabaly inevitable?</p>
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		<title>By: Mark E Hoffer</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/04/why-creditors-must-suffer/comment-page-1/#comment-159928</link>
		<dc:creator>Mark E Hoffer</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2009 00:59:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=23167#comment-159928</guid>
		<description>this, an interview w/ Max Keiser is more on topic:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wTZr0PgAdYQ

also calls for UK Pound to go the way Icelandic Krona

and, see: Ritholtz on evidence of fraud at AIG 
he&#039;s a fan of TBP.
http://maxkeiser.com/

Max is a sharp dude, willing to speak it as he sees it.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>this, an interview w/ Max Keiser is more on topic:<br />
<a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wTZr0PgAdYQ" rel="nofollow">http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wTZr0PgAdYQ</a></p>
<p>also calls for UK Pound to go the way Icelandic Krona</p>
<p>and, see: Ritholtz on evidence of fraud at AIG<br />
he&#8217;s a fan of TBP.<br />
<a href="http://maxkeiser.com/" rel="nofollow">http://maxkeiser.com/</a></p>
<p>Max is a sharp dude, willing to speak it as he sees it.</p>
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		<title>By: Moss</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/04/why-creditors-must-suffer/comment-page-1/#comment-159902</link>
		<dc:creator>Moss</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Apr 2009 23:44:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=23167#comment-159902</guid>
		<description>Was it not the failure of Lehman and the accompanying specter of credit default throughout the system that led to the panic and near collapse of the Global economic system? 

The problem as I see it is that we do not know who actually has a legitimate credit claim on these financial institutions. Is a CDS a legitimate claim when not used as a legitimate hedge? How would one quantify the fallout from making all creditors suffer? 

I imagine that GM&#039;s bankruptcy will be an experiment, in a more limited and controlled way, in this very exercise. The question with that will be if GMAC is included.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Was it not the failure of Lehman and the accompanying specter of credit default throughout the system that led to the panic and near collapse of the Global economic system? </p>
<p>The problem as I see it is that we do not know who actually has a legitimate credit claim on these financial institutions. Is a CDS a legitimate claim when not used as a legitimate hedge? How would one quantify the fallout from making all creditors suffer? </p>
<p>I imagine that GM&#8217;s bankruptcy will be an experiment, in a more limited and controlled way, in this very exercise. The question with that will be if GMAC is included.</p>
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		<title>By: zell</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/04/why-creditors-must-suffer/comment-page-1/#comment-159901</link>
		<dc:creator>zell</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Apr 2009 23:23:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=23167#comment-159901</guid>
		<description>The key question is how much does criminal behavior get a pass?  From the shadow banking system to the mega banks down to fraudulent home buyers, appraisers, mortgage outfits that colluded in the fraud, to the bundlers who acted as cut outs transforming and distributing bad paper, to the slice and dicers who obscured the real nature / risk of what was purveyed we have widespread participation in fraudulent transactions. It is a Fidelity case that is beyond measure.
What can we expect of gov&#039;t? As in all large organized crimes it can go after the people at the top who benefitted most and had the key roles. That&#039;s why top management should go... away.
We still don&#039;t know what they are sitting on so it&#039;s time to dig, not stress test.  Whether creditors or counterparties deserve consideratio we do not know.
When the credit system began to falter action had to be taken but we are now further down the line. Plans like the PIPP are a furtherance of illegitimate actions as it is a round around the legislature. What the Best and the Brightest&quot; are doing at the helm mystifies me.
Finance has to be reduced in its role in the economy.  And this is a good time to start. I hope Obama&#039;s Presidency is successful, very successful, but it&#039;s time to toss the questionable folks from his financial team. I&#039;m sure tall Paul can suggest some replacements........ and it&#039;s time to roust the banksters.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The key question is how much does criminal behavior get a pass?  From the shadow banking system to the mega banks down to fraudulent home buyers, appraisers, mortgage outfits that colluded in the fraud, to the bundlers who acted as cut outs transforming and distributing bad paper, to the slice and dicers who obscured the real nature / risk of what was purveyed we have widespread participation in fraudulent transactions. It is a Fidelity case that is beyond measure.<br />
What can we expect of gov&#8217;t? As in all large organized crimes it can go after the people at the top who benefitted most and had the key roles. That&#8217;s why top management should go&#8230; away.<br />
We still don&#8217;t know what they are sitting on so it&#8217;s time to dig, not stress test.  Whether creditors or counterparties deserve consideratio we do not know.<br />
When the credit system began to falter action had to be taken but we are now further down the line. Plans like the PIPP are a furtherance of illegitimate actions as it is a round around the legislature. What the Best and the Brightest&#8221; are doing at the helm mystifies me.<br />
Finance has to be reduced in its role in the economy.  And this is a good time to start. I hope Obama&#8217;s Presidency is successful, very successful, but it&#8217;s time to toss the questionable folks from his financial team. I&#8217;m sure tall Paul can suggest some replacements&#8230;&#8230;.. and it&#8217;s time to roust the banksters.</p>
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