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	<title>Comments on: Kabuki on the Potomac: Reforming Credit Default Swaps and OTC Derivatives + Kirby Comments</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/05/kabuki-on-the-potomac-reforming-credit-default-swaps-and-otc-derivatives-kirby-comments/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/05/kabuki-on-the-potomac-reforming-credit-default-swaps-and-otc-derivatives-kirby-comments/</link>
	<description>Macro Perspective on the Capital Markets, Economy, Geopolitics, Technology, and Digital Media</description>
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		<title>By: dunnage</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/05/kabuki-on-the-potomac-reforming-credit-default-swaps-and-otc-derivatives-kirby-comments/comment-page-1/#comment-180892</link>
		<dc:creator>dunnage</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2009 04:22:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=26953#comment-180892</guid>
		<description>Stress Tests for Money Centers came about so folks wouldn&#039;t ask about the books.  Nothing will change down the road:  Chase will be the Derivative House and Shadow Banks are just too unbelievably beyond the beyond to give up.  Oh, and don&#039;t forget these dudes can still trade commodities -- banks they may be, but they of course were given exclusions to the law -- extensions abailable and probably already applied for.

Now you and me and the Commercial Banks are cannon fodder.  Corner Office Players at the Money Centers will roll in the dough, but their institutions are going to be on the stretchers for years ala Japan.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Stress Tests for Money Centers came about so folks wouldn&#8217;t ask about the books.  Nothing will change down the road:  Chase will be the Derivative House and Shadow Banks are just too unbelievably beyond the beyond to give up.  Oh, and don&#8217;t forget these dudes can still trade commodities &#8212; banks they may be, but they of course were given exclusions to the law &#8212; extensions abailable and probably already applied for.</p>
<p>Now you and me and the Commercial Banks are cannon fodder.  Corner Office Players at the Money Centers will roll in the dough, but their institutions are going to be on the stretchers for years ala Japan.</p>
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		<title>By: drollere</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/05/kabuki-on-the-potomac-reforming-credit-default-swaps-and-otc-derivatives-kirby-comments/comment-page-1/#comment-176388</link>
		<dc:creator>drollere</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2009 16:21:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=26953#comment-176388</guid>
		<description>don&#039;t get lost in the details here guys. the fundamental point of this post is that two bright guys can&#039;t agree on the basic terms of a discussion, which means they both agree on -- the lack of transparency. 

credit or interest swaps are two flavors of the same confection, and the fact that one or the other is more or less necessary, or a greater or lesser portion of the total risk/liability/smoking crater is really beside the point. call it financial engineering, call it insurance, call it gambling -- it doesn&#039;t work because nobody can see it work. 

there&#039;s also the poignant fact (for me at least) that kabuki (a stylized performance in which players wear masks and, as part of the genre, must deliver speeches from stereotyped positions within a ritually defined stage) is not the problem here. go ahead, legislate otc&#039;s -- then derivatives will become custom contracts again ... &quot;customized&quot; by computers. (orwell&#039;s 1984 novel writing machines with a capitalist twist.)

the fundamental problem here is the culture of credit and debt. the culture of credit and debt created egregiously excessive and historically abrupt (60 years) global wealth. return increases with risk, so risk will always rise in the search for return. thus speculative bubbles are inherent in free markets, unless they are regulated into distribution systems. attempting to mix (or tolerating the coexistence) of free markets and regulated distribution systems only creates black markets, another term for bubbles ... or for &quot;custom&quot; derivative products outside the otc exchange accounting.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>don&#8217;t get lost in the details here guys. the fundamental point of this post is that two bright guys can&#8217;t agree on the basic terms of a discussion, which means they both agree on &#8212; the lack of transparency. </p>
<p>credit or interest swaps are two flavors of the same confection, and the fact that one or the other is more or less necessary, or a greater or lesser portion of the total risk/liability/smoking crater is really beside the point. call it financial engineering, call it insurance, call it gambling &#8212; it doesn&#8217;t work because nobody can see it work. </p>
<p>there&#8217;s also the poignant fact (for me at least) that kabuki (a stylized performance in which players wear masks and, as part of the genre, must deliver speeches from stereotyped positions within a ritually defined stage) is not the problem here. go ahead, legislate otc&#8217;s &#8212; then derivatives will become custom contracts again &#8230; &#8220;customized&#8221; by computers. (orwell&#8217;s 1984 novel writing machines with a capitalist twist.)</p>
<p>the fundamental problem here is the culture of credit and debt. the culture of credit and debt created egregiously excessive and historically abrupt (60 years) global wealth. return increases with risk, so risk will always rise in the search for return. thus speculative bubbles are inherent in free markets, unless they are regulated into distribution systems. attempting to mix (or tolerating the coexistence) of free markets and regulated distribution systems only creates black markets, another term for bubbles &#8230; or for &#8220;custom&#8221; derivative products outside the otc exchange accounting.</p>
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		<title>By: emmanuel117</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/05/kabuki-on-the-potomac-reforming-credit-default-swaps-and-otc-derivatives-kirby-comments/comment-page-1/#comment-173770</link>
		<dc:creator>emmanuel117</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 May 2009 14:36:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=26953#comment-173770</guid>
		<description>@Moss:

Yes. I also believe Larry Summers had Harvard buy some IRS while he was President there. They lost money when Bernanke lowered rates to zero and were forced to pay the banks to get rid of the swaps. 

A note of irony for that future historian.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@Moss:</p>
<p>Yes. I also believe Larry Summers had Harvard buy some IRS while he was President there. They lost money when Bernanke lowered rates to zero and were forced to pay the banks to get rid of the swaps. </p>
<p>A note of irony for that future historian.</p>
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		<title>By: Chris Whalen</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/05/kabuki-on-the-potomac-reforming-credit-default-swaps-and-otc-derivatives-kirby-comments/comment-page-1/#comment-173701</link>
		<dc:creator>Chris Whalen</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 May 2009 12:50:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=26953#comment-173701</guid>
		<description>Precisely.  I think that is one of Ron&#039;s key points, that the tail is wagging the dog.  The fact that this affects interest rates/currencies etc makes the IR story bigger for the global markets than CDS, another point made by Kirby.  I think his basic issue was the lack of focus on IR swaps and official shenanigans around same.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Precisely.  I think that is one of Ron&#8217;s key points, that the tail is wagging the dog.  The fact that this affects interest rates/currencies etc makes the IR story bigger for the global markets than CDS, another point made by Kirby.  I think his basic issue was the lack of focus on IR swaps and official shenanigans around same.</p>
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		<title>By: Mark E Hoffer</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/05/kabuki-on-the-potomac-reforming-credit-default-swaps-and-otc-derivatives-kirby-comments/comment-page-1/#comment-173693</link>
		<dc:creator>Mark E Hoffer</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 May 2009 12:33:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=26953#comment-173693</guid>
		<description>look at the notional value of the i-rate swaps v. total outstanding $ value of the USTreas complex..

one # is bigger than the other, even after assuming &#039;double-counting&#039; of &#039;both sides&#039; of the trade..</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>look at the notional value of the i-rate swaps v. total outstanding $ value of the USTreas complex..</p>
<p>one # is bigger than the other, even after assuming &#8216;double-counting&#8217; of &#8216;both sides&#8217; of the trade..</p>
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		<title>By: clawback</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/05/kabuki-on-the-potomac-reforming-credit-default-swaps-and-otc-derivatives-kirby-comments/comment-page-1/#comment-173673</link>
		<dc:creator>clawback</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 May 2009 11:31:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=26953#comment-173673</guid>
		<description>@d4winds

Good points all round.  That was one of the questions I had about Kirby&#039;s letter -- if we&#039;re talking about IRS, one would think (maybe) that the swaps would be part of a hedge, esp if they were in a trade involving any kind of Treasury.  Is Kirby&#039;s concern that they aren&#039;t hedged?  Or would that likely be the case given the seeming inability of certain players to use derivatives AS hedges, rather than to increase leverage and blow themselves up.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@d4winds</p>
<p>Good points all round.  That was one of the questions I had about Kirby&#8217;s letter &#8212; if we&#8217;re talking about IRS, one would think (maybe) that the swaps would be part of a hedge, esp if they were in a trade involving any kind of Treasury.  Is Kirby&#8217;s concern that they aren&#8217;t hedged?  Or would that likely be the case given the seeming inability of certain players to use derivatives AS hedges, rather than to increase leverage and blow themselves up.</p>
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		<title>By: d4winds</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/05/kabuki-on-the-potomac-reforming-credit-default-swaps-and-otc-derivatives-kirby-comments/comment-page-1/#comment-173669</link>
		<dc:creator>d4winds</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 May 2009 10:28:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=26953#comment-173669</guid>
		<description>Interest rate swaps can be easily, completely hedged by elementary means; the fixed rate payor&#039;s payment is just a leveling of the forward rate curve.  CDS&#039;s are a very different animal and cannot be hedged other than partially and only with instruments whose pricing is every bit as problematic (total return swaps, e.g.).  Their pricing necessarily involves formal models using so-called incomplete markets, i.e., non-hedgeable primitives are embedded in the product.  (See the text by Schonbucher, e.g).  Gaussian (or other) copulas  are used to compound the uncertainties surrounding a named-risk by pretending to know, contingent on said uncertainties having been assumed away via faith in the untestable single risk models, how prices co-vary (or, to be more precise,  how price-driving modelling parameters, such as the risk-neutral distribution of the time to default, co-vary).  

So, qua &quot;derivative&quot;, CDS&#039;s are a bogus product, since hedges cannot be deduced from the valuation itself to supply a sanity check on the valuation--this being the very meaning of incomplete markets.  Since their valuation rests, further, on an assumed pricing (&quot;risk-neutral&quot;) distrubution only tenuously connected  (&quot;equivalent measures&quot; is the probabilist&#039;s term for the connection) to the econometric one of history, historical data cannot, by definition, be used to judge their reasonableness either.  

So neither other market data nor past history can be used to guage the reasonability of CDS pricing--and this is so on the very logical, quant-fin grounds used to justify the pricing in the first place.
By contrast to interest rate swaps, which are highly derivative and hedgeable, they are thus complete &quot;trust me&quot; products.

Of course, naked CDS&#039;s are also in may ways equivalent to the old, subsequently-outlawed bucket shops which helped exacerbate the Panic of 1907 and would now be illegal were it not for an express exemption from the anit-bucket shop laws by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act.  The non-naked CDS&#039;s pose moral hazard issues in preventing negotiated resolutions of reorganizations rather than forced Chapter 11 with a Chapter 7 imminent.  They have no rationale as a derivative and no socially defensible purpose other than as fee-makers for Wall Street and as high stakes gambling conduits (with taxpayer backstops for the politically well-heeled).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Interest rate swaps can be easily, completely hedged by elementary means; the fixed rate payor&#8217;s payment is just a leveling of the forward rate curve.  CDS&#8217;s are a very different animal and cannot be hedged other than partially and only with instruments whose pricing is every bit as problematic (total return swaps, e.g.).  Their pricing necessarily involves formal models using so-called incomplete markets, i.e., non-hedgeable primitives are embedded in the product.  (See the text by Schonbucher, e.g).  Gaussian (or other) copulas  are used to compound the uncertainties surrounding a named-risk by pretending to know, contingent on said uncertainties having been assumed away via faith in the untestable single risk models, how prices co-vary (or, to be more precise,  how price-driving modelling parameters, such as the risk-neutral distribution of the time to default, co-vary).  </p>
<p>So, qua &#8220;derivative&#8221;, CDS&#8217;s are a bogus product, since hedges cannot be deduced from the valuation itself to supply a sanity check on the valuation&#8211;this being the very meaning of incomplete markets.  Since their valuation rests, further, on an assumed pricing (&#8220;risk-neutral&#8221;) distrubution only tenuously connected  (&#8220;equivalent measures&#8221; is the probabilist&#8217;s term for the connection) to the econometric one of history, historical data cannot, by definition, be used to judge their reasonableness either.  </p>
<p>So neither other market data nor past history can be used to guage the reasonability of CDS pricing&#8211;and this is so on the very logical, quant-fin grounds used to justify the pricing in the first place.<br />
By contrast to interest rate swaps, which are highly derivative and hedgeable, they are thus complete &#8220;trust me&#8221; products.</p>
<p>Of course, naked CDS&#8217;s are also in may ways equivalent to the old, subsequently-outlawed bucket shops which helped exacerbate the Panic of 1907 and would now be illegal were it not for an express exemption from the anit-bucket shop laws by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act.  The non-naked CDS&#8217;s pose moral hazard issues in preventing negotiated resolutions of reorganizations rather than forced Chapter 11 with a Chapter 7 imminent.  They have no rationale as a derivative and no socially defensible purpose other than as fee-makers for Wall Street and as high stakes gambling conduits (with taxpayer backstops for the politically well-heeled).</p>
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		<title>By: Moss</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/05/kabuki-on-the-potomac-reforming-credit-default-swaps-and-otc-derivatives-kirby-comments/comment-page-1/#comment-173477</link>
		<dc:creator>Moss</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2009 21:32:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=26953#comment-173477</guid>
		<description>Didn&#039;t the banks screw many municipalities with IRS linked to their muni bond offerings?

I sure hope all these economically useless but fee generating voodoo schemes get outlawed.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Didn&#8217;t the banks screw many municipalities with IRS linked to their muni bond offerings?</p>
<p>I sure hope all these economically useless but fee generating voodoo schemes get outlawed.</p>
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		<title>By: Mark E Hoffer</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/05/kabuki-on-the-potomac-reforming-credit-default-swaps-and-otc-derivatives-kirby-comments/comment-page-1/#comment-173279</link>
		<dc:creator>Mark E Hoffer</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2009 16:04:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=26953#comment-173279</guid>
		<description>Chris, 

you do a valuable Service by providing your Insight, to the general Weal, FOC.

As you know, many pay, quantities of Paperbacks, for similiar intel.
~~

clawback, 

ya think?  you, just, might be on the right track..might want to, you know, do some Research..</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Chris, </p>
<p>you do a valuable Service by providing your Insight, to the general Weal, FOC.</p>
<p>As you know, many pay, quantities of Paperbacks, for similiar intel.<br />
~~</p>
<p>clawback, </p>
<p>ya think?  you, just, might be on the right track..might want to, you know, do some Research..</p>
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		<title>By: clawback</title>
		<link>http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/05/kabuki-on-the-potomac-reforming-credit-default-swaps-and-otc-derivatives-kirby-comments/comment-page-1/#comment-173270</link>
		<dc:creator>clawback</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2009 15:47:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/?p=26953#comment-173270</guid>
		<description>What is Kirby&#039;s point about the IRS and the yield on Treasurys?  It may be obvious to others, but I&#039;m out of my depth on this one.  Is he suggesting that Treasury rates are being kept down to keep the banks IRS from blowing up?

Thanks in advance for any help.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What is Kirby&#8217;s point about the IRS and the yield on Treasurys?  It may be obvious to others, but I&#8217;m out of my depth on this one.  Is he suggesting that Treasury rates are being kept down to keep the banks IRS from blowing up?</p>
<p>Thanks in advance for any help.</p>
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