Congress and TBTF – Bring in the Bomb Squad

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By Josh Rosner - October 28th, 2009, 9:15PM

Joshua Rosner examines the House regulatory reform bill, which does not, in its current form, acknowledge that “Too Big to Fail” is too big to exist.

The House draft bill written by Rep. Barney Frank (D – MA) – along with several former Fed attorneys and Treasury staff and consultants — ignores fundamental reality: You don’t employ a bomb squad to sit around and wait for a bomb to explode, you engage them to dismantle it as soon as they find one.

Unfortunately, this bill is one more act of sleight of hand by a congress that, to the detriment of the public, fails to see that banks are there to serve the public good and can be regulated with such a goal. An honest bill would recognize that any institution that is “Too Big to Fail” should be given economic ‘incentives’ (through prohibitively high capital levels and insurance assessments) to shrink or sell off business units. The notion that we do not have the right to break up anti-competitive and oligo-polistic businesses flies in the face of antitrust laws and ignores the valuable lessons in growth demonstrated by Teddy Roosevelt’s trust-busting. Those legislators who are truly seeking to protect the public interest and to be worthy of re-election, should demand that legislation spell out, in plain English, that the entire capital structure of a TBTF institution be wiped out, and its holding company held responsible as a source of strength, before taxpayers are exposed to a single dollar of loss.

If leadership won’t add such language, call your elected official and ask how much they actually receive when they agree to put on the kneepads.

Rather than require the break-up or shrinkage of those institutions, this bill suggests we leave the institution intact until it becomes ‘troubled’ and instead subject it to greater oversight by the same Fed that mismanaged prudential oversight of precisely the large financial holding companies at the center of the crisis. Keep in mind that even on the 1-5 (best to worst) secret rating scale regulators use to define ‘troubled institutions’, BofA was only a 3 and it has been speculated that Citi was only a 2 even as they were begging the government for support. Should we wait to act until an institution is even worse off than they were in the height of the crisis?

This Trojan horse of a bill will recognize and codify the view that we must accept and agree to live in a world where there are institutions that are TBTF. We have chosen to head in the opposite direction from the responsible approach suggested by both Bank of England Governor Mervyn King, who wants to break up TBTF institutions, and other European regulators who are likely to oversee the breakup of TBTF institutions, ING and Lloyds.

Each of the elements of this historic and flawed approach was carefully negotiated in close coordination with the most interested parties – that is, the bankers and their friends. Mock hearings will be this week and the complete bill will be marked up mid-week next week. When the hearings begin, the public should demand to know how many of these “experts” have ever taken money as consultants or employees of the “Too Big To Fail” (TBTF) banks or the Federal Reserve System. You can play along with the game show at home by watching the testifying “experts” closely. Try to keep score of how many of  them identified the collapse of our credit markets in 2006 or 2007. You can go on to the bonus round and score which of these “experts” expressed a view or
highlighted the risk that the Fed’s “emergency powers” would create a moral hazard and be used to bail out our banks. Importantly, Senator Chris Dodd put these powers into legislation in the dark of night in 1991 at the request of Goldman Sachs and other large beneficiaries of government support in this crisis.

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Wednesday Reading

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By Barry Ritholtz - October 28th, 2009, 4:30PM

Some killer stuff here:

How mistaken ideas helped to bring the economy down (FT)

• Jubbak: Why big banks hate banking (MSN)

Reflation Trade Shifting Into Reverse? (Barrons)

Uncle Sam Adds 5% to Prices of Homes, Goldman Says (WSJ Deelopments)

• Rex Nutting: 7 hidden ways to watch economic indicators (Marketwatch)

Bond Weakling California Shows States’ Failure to Disclose Debt (Bloomberg)

CNBC Viewership Plunges 50% In October (Zero Hedge)

Silicon Valley office vacancies near 20 percent (Merc)

Memories of Friends Departed Endure on Facebook (Facebook blog)

• Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Antonin Scalia A Conversation On The Constitution (Video)


What are you reading?

Cash for Clunkers cost how much?

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By Peter Boockvar - October 28th, 2009, 3:32PM

As the debate intensifies on whether and what form to extend the home buying tax credit, one argument against it is why give a credit to someone who planned on buying a home anyway. With 85% of 1st time home buyers who were eligible to collect the tax credit planning to buy a home anyway, the Brookings institute estimates that the $8,000 credit equates to a cost to the taxpayer of $43,000 per home. This is based on the belief that 85% of the almost 2mm buyers are getting free money. Edmonds.com today is estimating that the Cash for Clunkers program cost taxpayers $24,000 per vehicle sold. They estimate that 82% of sales would have happened anyway and thus the handout of up to $4,500 really only enticed 18% of the buyers of 690k vehicles sold under the program.

Realty Alliance Discussion

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By Barry Ritholtz - October 28th, 2009, 3:15PM

I am off to a panel at the Realty Alliance where I will kill the agents their with some tough love.

Here is the panel:

Barry Ritholtz, author of Bailout Nation, who will speak on the financial markets. Jonathan Miller of MillerSamuel will discuss Appraisals. Also, Carter Murdoch, economist with Bank of America. We are expecting U.S. Senator Johnny Isakson and FHA Commissioner Dave Stevens, as well, but their participation is always contingent upon last-minute scheduling. David Adamo will join us, as well, to talk about the current status of jumbo funding. I also expect one or two speakers from NAR on legislative, regulatory and legal issues.

This should be lots of giggles . . .

RSS Feed Go Wild (part II)

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By Barry Ritholtz - October 28th, 2009, 2:30PM

rss 71k More wacky RSS stuff: I mentioned last week that my RSS feed leaped from the low 40ks to mid 50k.

Yesterday, it again popped — to over 71k, before slipping back to 58k.

I have no idea why . . .

If anyone has a clue, feel free to explain.

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Previously:
RSS Feeds Go Wild (October 22, 1961)

http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/10/rss-feeds-go-wild/

Stephen Roach on China

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By Barry Ritholtz - October 28th, 2009, 1:00PM

Strategic Non-Foreclosure

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By Barry Ritholtz - October 28th, 2009, 12:00PM

This morning, we discussed Strategic Mortgage Default. This afternoon, let’s look at Strategic Non-Foreclosure.

Data via LPS‘ Monthly Mortgage Monitor shows a growing disparity between delinquencies and foreclosure starts. In other words, as more people fall behind on their mortgages, banks are becoming increasingly leery of putting them into foreclosure.
LPS calls this “Shadow Foreclosure Inventory” – The number of loans deteriorating further into delinquent status is more than twice the volume of foreclosure starts.

Why would they wait? Some of it is voluntary foreclosure abatement, some mortgage mod delays. Yet the chart below implies something beyond that. Perhaps its strategic.

Consider: The bank may have other (more expensive?) local properties that would be effected by a foreclosure. They may be waiting for a more advantageous time of year to put the homes up for sale. But I suspect the biggest reason are costs: Until foreclosure, the nominal owner remains liable for all state, real estate and local school taxes. Plus, some localities require regular maintenance (mow yard, clean street, shovel sidewalk, etc.)

Hence, not foreclosing not only gives the owner time to get current, but may also prevent the bank from accruing expenses . . .

Here is LPS chart:
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click for larger graph
Shadow Foreclosure Inventory
Data as of September 30, 2009 Month-end

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As Annaly Salvos notes:

“As the graph illustrates, delinquencies are rising, but foreclosure starts are not. As of September 2009, 90+deterioration more than doubled actual foreclosure starts. LPS has dubbed this “shadow foreclosure inventory.” Higher unemployment begets delinquencies and defaults, but foreclosures aren’t flowing through due to modification efforts and various moratoria. Depending on the success of programs like HAMP, more than a few of these loans are still destined for foreclosure.”

Good stuff.

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Hat tip Scott F!

Sources:
September 2009 Mortgage Performance Observations
LPS Mortgage Monitor, October 15, 2009

http://www.lpsvcs.com/NewsRoom/IndustryData/Documents/10-2009%20Mortgage%20Monitor/LPS%20Mortgage%20Monitor%20Sep09.pdf

Who Knows What Evil Lurks In The Hearts of Men?
Annaly Salvos
October 27th, 2009

http://www.annaly.com/blog/?p=659

The Global Financial Crisis and Offshore Dollar Markets

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By Barry Ritholtz - October 28th, 2009, 11:45AM

Description:

Facing a shortage of U.S. dollars and a growing need to support their dollar-denominated assets during the financial crisis, international firms increasingly turned to the foreign exchange swap market and other secured funding sources. An analysis of the ensuing strains in the swap market shows that the dollar “basis”—the premium international institutions pay for dollar funding—became persistently large and positive, chiefly as a result of the higher funding costs paid by smaller firms and non-U.S. banks. The widening of the basis underscores the severity and breadth of the crisis as markets designed to facilitate the flow of dollars faltered and institutions worldwide struggled to obtain funds.

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The Global Financial Crisis and Offshore

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Source:
The Global Financial Crisis and Offshore Dollar Markets
October 2009 Volume 15, Number 6
JEL classification: G10, G20
Authors: Niall Coffey, Warren B. Hrung, Hoai-Luu Nguyen,
and Asani Sarkar

http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/ci15-6.html

Happy 80th Anniversary, 1929 Crash!

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By Barry Ritholtz - October 28th, 2009, 10:46AM

1929_Dow_whoopsieHas it only been 80 years? Gee, time really flies when you are accumulating debt at compound interest rates.

On this inauspicious anniversary, lets look at some fun stuff:

1927-1933 Chart of Pompous Prognosticators

Bear Market Comparisons, 1929-2009

100 Year Dow Jones Industrials Chart

The Crash of 1929

Anyone find any other worthwhile ’29 crash related stuff, please let me know . . .

New Home Sales Fall

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By Barry Ritholtz - October 28th, 2009, 10:02AM

U.S. new home sales in September fell 3.6% from August, and were down 7.8% year-over-year. This is the first decline in monthly new home sales after five consecutive monthly gains.

Median sales prices have fallen 9.1% in the past year to $204,800. Best news in the release: The supply of homes on the market fell to 251,000 in September, which is the lowest level since November 1982.

Commerce:

Sales of new one-family houses in September 2009 were at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 402,000, according to estimates released jointly today by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. This is 3.6 percent (±10.2%)* below the revised August rate of 417,000 and is 7.8 percent (±12.0%)* below the September 2008 estimate of 436,000.

Note that this data series is particularly noisy, and often mean reverts every 2 months. On top of that, neither the monthly nor the annual changes are statistically meaningful, as they are both less thanthe margin of error.

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new home sales 9.09

via Barron’s Econoday

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Previously:

New Home Sales Data: Don’t rely On It Either (November 30th, 2005)

http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2005/11/new-home-sales-data-dont-rely-on-it-either/

Source:
NEW RESIDENTIAL SALES IN SEPTEMBER 2009

http://www.census.gov/const/newressales_200909.pdf

http://www.census.gov/const/newressales.pdf

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