Bill Black is the author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One and an associate professor of economics and law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. He is a white-collar criminologist who has spent years working on regulatory policy and fraud prevention as Executive Director of the Institute for Fraud Prevention, Litigation Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and Deputy Director of the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement, among other positions.

Part II  is here.

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By William K. Black

Honest accounting is essential for effective regulation – and for integrity. It is also very helpful to prosecuting accounting fraud. The banking industry lobbyists, including the Chamber of Commerce, with Bernanke’s support, induced the House to extort successfully the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to gimmick the accounting rules so that banks would not have to report their losses. This accounting scam was implemented in order to gut the Prompt Corrective Action law (which the Bush and Obama regulators wished to evade) and allow the banks controlling officers to pay themselves and their officers billions of dollars of bonuses to which they were not entitled. This shameful act makes it far more difficult for regulators to take effective action against fraudulent and incompetent bankers. It is essential that we restore honest accounting. Indeed, it is vital that the SEC, the PCAOB, and FASB clean up existing accounting defects, such as the endemic failures to provide remotely adequate loss reserves (ALLL) for mortgage loans, CDOs, and CDS. (The international accounting rules are being interpreted even worse – abusive accounting is an open invitation to accounting control frauds.)

The only effective way to implement such a sea change in regulatory mindset is with new leadership. The Obama administration has largely left in place Bush’s failed regulators like Dugan (OCC), reappointed failed regulators like Bernanke (Fed), appointed failed regulators like Shapiro (SEC), and promoted failed regulators like Geithner (Treasury). There are financial regulators with a track record of success, regulators who public administration scholars use as exemplars in their writings of effective regulatory leadership. To my knowledge, the Obama administration has appointed none of them and consulted none of them as to the lessons they learned about what worked and what failed. The exception is Paul Volcker, who was never an “in the trenches” regulator, but who is certainly brilliant. He prompted passage of the Volcker Rule in the Dodd-Frank Act. Larry Summers, according to published accounts, deliberately marginalized and excluded Volcker in order to minimize his ability to influence President Obama. Rubin and his protégés fear a real regulator investigating the banks whose nonprime loans and CDOs drove the crisis. Rubin’s personal nightmare is a vigorous investigation of Citicorp. Any real regulator would make that nightmare a reality within a week. The chances that the administration will appoint a senior banking regulator with a track record of success remain small

Category: Bailouts, Regulation, Think Tank

Please use the comments to demonstrate your own ignorance, unfamiliarity with empirical data and lack of respect for scientific knowledge. Be sure to create straw men and argue against things I have neither said nor implied. If you could repeat previously discredited memes or steer the conversation into irrelevant, off topic discussions, it would be appreciated. Lastly, kindly forgo all civility in your discourse . . . you are, after all, anonymous.

One Response to “How to Regulate Mortgage Lending, Part 3”

  1. [...] Black has been publishing a lot lately (see the 3 part series on How to regulate mortgages) and recently launched a more active web presence at New Economic [...]