Fat Cats and Starving Dogs; Happy Foxes and Sad Sacks

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By Barry Ritholtz - January 22nd, 2012, 8:35AM

This weekend, I saw Margin Call on DVD. Jeremy Irons plays a CEO of a small Goldman Sachs like company.

A young analyst at the firm discovers that their highly-leveraged, massive mortgage bets are based on a VAR formula that’s flawed. It failed to consider volatility ranges beyond historical distributions. With the market swinging, his calculations show a 25% move in the underlying holdings will wipe the company out and then some.

Irons ends up giving a speech to Kevin Spacey towards the end of the film — no spoilers here — its just a fascinating digression, that goes something like this:

“Its just money; its made up. Pieces of paper with pictures on it so we don’t have to kill each other just to get something to eat. It’s not wrong. And it’s certainly no different today than its ever been. 1637, 1797, 1819, 37, 57, 84, 1901, 07, 29, 1937, 1974, 1987 — Jesus, didn’t that fuck up me up good — 92, 97, 2000 and whatever we want to call this [2008].

It’s all just the same thing over and over; we can’t help ourselves. And you and I can’t control it, or stop it, or even slow it. Or even ever-so-slightly alter it. We just react. And we make a lot money if we get it right. And we get left by the side of the side of the road if we get it wrong.

And there have always been and there always will be the same percentage of winners and losers. Happy foxes and sad sacks. Fat cats and starving dogs in this world. Yeah, there may be more of us today than there’s ever been. But the percentages-they stay exactly the same.”

Its a great film (IMDB) — if you have not seen it yet, move it to the top of your Netflix queue . .  .

Re-hypothecation: How it’s related to MF Global

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By Barry Ritholtz - January 5th, 2012, 5:00AM

Marketplace Whiteboard:

If ever there was a word that you’d expect to find in a Harry Potter  novel, it’s re-hypothecation. This a classic example of financial  people inventing impenetrable terminology to make their business look  like a black art. “Oooh, re-hypothecation, it must be magic!”

Well it isn’t.

The term “re-hypothecation” came up a lot during the MF Global meltdown; It’s quite a common term in the securities market – but what does it mean?

To explain re-hypothecation, we have to explain hypothecation. And  hypothecation is pretty simple. It’s when you lend someone money and let  the borrower keep the collateral.

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Source:
Re-hypothecation: How it’s related to MF Global
Paddy Hirsch
Marketplace Jan 4, 2012
http://www.marketplace.org/topics/business/whiteboard/re-hypothecation-how-its-related-mf-global

MBIA vs BAC: On why the loss causation ruling is important

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By Guest Author - January 3rd, 2012, 4:32PM

“Bank of America Corp. may face billions of dollars more in liability for faulty mortgages if a judge agrees with insurer MBIA Inc. that the lender must buy back loans even if the errors didn’t cause a borrower’s default…If New York Supreme Court Justice Eileen Bransten and judges in similar cases across the country rule that the issue of “causation” doesn’t apply — meaning it’s enough to show that the loan was improperly made — it “could significantly impact” Bank of America’s potential costs, the bank said in a regulatory filing this month…

Such court defeats may add as much as $9 billion to what Bank of America owes bond insurers, according to hedge fund Branch Hill Capital, which is betting against its stock and has invested in MBIA. A victory for Armonk, New York-based MBIA may also strengthen claims by mortgage-securities investors…“You don’t have to wait until you’re in a severe accident before you return the car with bad brakes,” said David Grais…

The decision may intensify settlement talks between bond insurers like MBIA and other banks that issued securities based on faulty mortgages, according to the head of insurer Assured Guaranty Ltd., which is demanding money from lenders including UBS AG and Credit Suisse Group AG…

“If they lose that case, then our certainty of getting reimbursed becomes a lot higher,” Dominic Frederico, Assured’s chief executive officer, said in an interview…

Since the start of 2010, Bank of America’s cushion for future losses on repurchases of mortgages that never matched their promised quality has ballooned from $4 billion to $17.8 billion even as it made payments in settlements with debt guarantors such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government- supported mortgage giants…

Its reserves and guidance on how much more it may need are based on several assumptions, though, including the company’s view that losses will only have to be reimbursed if it can be proven “that the alleged representations and warranties breach was the cause of the loss,” the bank said in the Aug. 4 filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. If courts disagree, “it could significantly impact” the estimate of as much as $5 billion in additional liabilities…

“It could change the playing field,” MBIA Chief Executive Officer Jay Brown said on an Aug. 10 conference call with analysts and investors when asked about the causation issue. It could “have a very significant effect on the ability to rescind or obtain recessionary damages,” he said. “So, it can affect the view of both parties as to the likely outcome of the trial.”…

In December, Justice Bransten denied Bank of America’s bid to prevent MBIA from using reviews of samples of loans in the case, rather than requiring reviews of every individual mortgage in dispute. The ruling may add to the threats facing Bank of America by encouraging suits, according to the SEC filing…

Bank of America needs to set aside between $10.6 billion and $44.4 billion more to cover losses on soured mortgages sold to or insured by others, said Chris Gamaitoni, a Compass Point Research and Trading LLC analyst…

MBIA’s lawyers at Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP are also arguing that insurance law should allow it to win against Bank of America on breach-of-contract and fraud claims without proving causation…The causation issue alone may add $8 billion to $9 billion of liabilities from bond insurers, said Manal Mehta, a partner at Branch Hill Capital in San Francisco…

“That is probably as important as the statistical sampling ruling,” Mehta said. “It would take away one of Countrywide’s key defenses and significantly accelerate the timetable for litigation.”…Bank of America, in its talks with 22 of the world’s largest debt investors, argued that any loan repurchase would require loss causation be proven, according to a filing in New York state court of an expert opinion by Brian Lin, a managing director at RRMS Advisors. Those negotiations led to the proposed $8.5 billion settlement…

Lin said a settlement between $8.8 billion and $11 billion would be reasonable, relying in part on an assumption that investors would be successful in getting Bank of America to repurchase only 40 percent of misrepresented loans…

Lin was hired by Bank of New York Mellon Corp., the bonds’ trustee that is seeking approval for the accord.”

The (sizable) Role of Rehypothecation in the Shadow Banking System

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By Barry Ritholtz - December 18th, 2011, 8:43PM

The (sizable) Role of Rehypothecation in the Shadow Banking System
Singh, Manmohan ; Aitken, James
July 01, 2010

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This paper examines the sizable role of rehypothecation in the shadow banking system. Rehypothecation is the practice that allows collateral posted by, say, a hedge fund to its prime broker to be used again as collateral by that prime broker for its own funding. In the United Kingdom, such use of a customer’s assets by a prime broker can be for an unlimited amount of the customer’s assets while in the United States rehypothecation is capped. Incorporating estimates for rehypothecation (and the associated re-use of collateral) in the recent crisis indicates that the collapse in non-bank funding to banks was sizable. We show that the shadow banking system was at least 50 percent bigger than documented so far. We also provide estimates from the hedge fund industry for the – churning – factor or re-use of collateral. From a policy angle, supervisors of large banks that report on a global consolidated basis may need to enhance their understanding of the off-balance sheet funding that these banks receive via rehypothecation from other jurisdictions.

wp10172-1

MF Global Collapse Reveals Systemic Risk

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By Barry Ritholtz - December 18th, 2011, 8:00AM

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My Sunday Washington Post column is out this morning. Today, we look at The systemic risk revealed by MF Global’s collapse.

As has been the case so many times, the details of this debacle are found in the regulatory changes lobbied for — and recieved — by Corzine and the MF Global legal crew. In researching this column, I discovered several deeply disturbing facts.

Here’s an excerpt from the column:

1. What MF Global did with client monies was “technically” legal (though it probably violated the spirit of the law).

2. Britain’s leverage loopholes provided a back door for U.S. firms such as Lehman Brothers and MF Global to “re-hypothecate” client assets — and leverage up.

3. As a result of MF Global’s lobbying, key rules were deregulated. This allowed the firm to use client money to buy risky sovereign debt.

4. In 2010, someone from the Commodities Futures Trading Commission recognized these prior deregulations had dramatically ramped clients’ exposure to risk and proposed changing those rules. Jon Corzine, MF Global’s chief executive, successfully prevented the tightening of these regulations. Had the regulations been tightened, it would have prevented the kind of bets that lost MF Global’s segregated client monies.

5. None of MF Global’s Canadian clients lost any money thanks to tighter regulations there.

6. Little noticed in this affair is (once again) the gross incompetency of the ratings agencies. Had they not been maintaining “A” ratings on Spain and Italy, MF Global could not have made its disastrous bets there.

The dead tree version of the paper uses a photo of Corzine that is not particularly flattering:

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click for ginormous version of print edition


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Source:
The systemic risk revealed by MF Global’s collapse
Barry Ritholtz
Washington Post, December 18, 2011
www.washingtonpost.com/the-systemic-risk-revealed-by-mf-globals-collapse/2011/12/14/gIQAtrTI1O_story.html

Washington Post Sunday, December 18, 2011 2011 page G6 (PDF)

The (sizable) Role of Rehypothecation In The Shadow Banking System

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By Barry Ritholtz - December 13th, 2011, 11:25AM

IMF Working Paper
Monetary and Capital Markets Department
The (sizable) Role of Rehypothecation in the Shadow Banking System
Prepared by Manmohan Singh and James Aitken1
Authorized for distribution by Karl Habermeier
July 2010

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Ratigan: Inside the Unregulated Shadow Swaps Market

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By Barry Ritholtz - December 7th, 2011, 10:15AM

Visit msnbc.com for breaking news, world news, and news about the economy

Read the rest of this entry »

Discuss: Goldman Is the New Master of the EU?

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By Barry Ritholtz - November 19th, 2011, 7:30PM

Discuss:

The Independent writes:

“This is The Goldman Sachs Project. Put simply, it is to hug governments close. Every business wants to advance its interests with the regulators that can stymie them and the politicians who can give them a tax break, but this is no mere lobbying effort. Goldman is there to provide advice for governments and to provide financing, to send its people into public service and to dangle lucrative jobs in front of people coming out of government. The Project is to create such a deep exchange of people and ideas and money that it is impossible to tell the difference between the public interest and the Goldman Sachs interest.”


Source: The Independent

“While ordinary people fret about austerity and jobs, the eurozone’s corridors of power have been undergoing a remarkable transformation.”

CDS, Market Turmoil, Asset Allocation

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By David Kotok - November 12th, 2011, 6:30AM

CDS, Market Turmoil, Asset Allocation
David R. Kotok
November 12, 2011

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Let us consider this week’s credit default swap (CDS) debacle in the following manner. People purchased CDS with the understanding that they had a type of insurance policy against the default of a sovereign debtor. Now they have learned that what they thought they had is something they do not have. The European Greek debt deal and the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, www.isda.org (ISDA) have clarified that.

What do they do? They must realign their positions. First, they have to face the reality that they were misinformed or misadvised. They must accept that their position has changed. Second, they must take action.

The spike in yields on sovereign debt of Italy was attributable, only in part, to the Italian political turmoil we are witnessing. The other aspect dealt with CDS on Italian debt. Those holders thought they had one type of CDS protection. They realized from the events in Greece that they had something else.

This is true of other sovereign CDS as well, and this change has roiled the markets. Interest rates have risen as bond prices have fallen. The cost of finance for Italy has gone up to levels that are deemed unsustainable. This is what one would expect with CDS realignment.

Does that mean the world is ending? No. In fact, there is a considerable possibility that the current stock market rally has the outlook correctly discounted, after this turmoil runs its course. If you examine Italy’s budgetary characteristics, you realize the country is headed for a primary surplus in 2013. “Primary surplus means after you deduct interest payments.”

Will Italy be able to complete the plan? Will they be able to implement it? What is going to happen? What about other exogenous shocks? All these questions are fair and they are additive to the uncertainty premium.

Italy may have a difficult issue when it attempts to roll its present debt, and that debt roll of maturities is coming up very quickly. However, with the help of the European Central Bank (ECB) Italy is likely to have some market access and be able to roll that debt on the heels of budgetary action

How will it roll? What will the yields be? These and more questions await answers.

Another crunch is coming up on for the debt roll of Greece. That is why the referendum threat dates were December 4 and December 11: the second half of December is when Greece must roll billions of euro-denominated debt. The authorities in Europe know they need sufficient structure in place so that this debt can roll without market access by Greece. Greece has been shut out of market access. The market believes it is an insolvent sovereign. In addition, there are the continuing operational demands for cash by the Greek government. This money will be provided with institutional lending, through one of the forms we presently see discussed.

Does this mix of European debt roll condemn the US to a recession? We think not.

The United States is not in recession. It is in a very slow-growth environment. Uncertainties are very high and uncertainty premiums are large, but decisions about US portfolios are based upon whether you are betting on recession, or slow growth.

If it is slow growth, stocks are inexpensive and markets are headed higher. That is the position of Cumberland Advisors. If a double-dip recession is coming, then stocks are headed lower and you should not own them.

The course of action to take in global portfolios is a different matter. In our global multi-asset class, we have taken our precious metal positions to 6% of the total deployment. That is very, very high and it is a considerable overweight for us. Precious metals are a tiny weight in global asset allocation under normal circumstances. We use several ETFs to reach that position, and they reflect an amalgamation of precious metal exposure.

We have this precious metal weight very high because, we are able to see a monetary policy transmission effect that reaches into precious metals. That supports our view that precious metals are likely to be priced higher in US dollar terms in the future. There is a considerable time lag between central bank actions and monetary effects and resultant higher precious metal prices; we measure that somewhere between nine and eighteen months.

We do not find the same relationship with commodities. Commodities are driven by other extensive factors in addition to liquidity flows from the creation of credit. Central bank balance sheet expansion has a weak link to commodities in this current environment, where central banks are attempting to provide as much liquidity as possible to avoid systemic meltdown.

When it comes to global stock markets, our international positions in Europe are far below the 24% weight that Europe holds in the benchmark index. Our exposure is limited to Germany, France, the Netherlands, and a broader-based international ETF. For Europe as a whole, we are very much underweight. In our international models, that weight is 11%, with all of it in Northern Europe.

In our global multi-asset class, we have only 3% exposure to the Eurozone stock markets. So clearly, we have a bias against Europe and in favor of other locations around the world, as well as other asset classes. In our global multi-asset class, we have 6%, or twice the exposure, in precious metals than we do in the stock markets of the Eurozone. That is a remarkable statement to make. It reflects the high degree of uncertainty given the times we are experiencing.

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David R. Kotok, Chairman and Chief Investment Officer

Can Litigation Bring Down Wall Street?

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By Barry Ritholtz - November 3rd, 2011, 12:00PM

Click to watch video:

Source:
Can litigation bring down Wall Street?
FT. com

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