Final Thoughts on GS Controversy

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By Barry Ritholtz - March 15th, 2012, 10:30AM

I just did a phoner on Bloomberg TV on Goldie, and I suspect this meme has just about run its viral course.

To me, the key takeaways are as follows:

Publicly Traded Banks: When firms shifted from Partnerships to publicly traded banks, their priorities changed.
Profits First: Meeting quarterly profit estimates became job 1; everything else, including the corporate culture, was secondary.
Not Just Goldman: GS may have lost $3b in cap yesterday, but I doubt they will lose many clients. Where are they going to go, to the choirboys who work at Morgan Stanley, or to the philanthropic organization known as Deutsche Bank?
Derivatives are Opaque: The issue with complex products is lack of transparency. Derivative fees are opaque, the products are complex, and muppets clients do not understand how much margin is built in.
Counter-Party vs Fiduciary:  The complexity of these products often leads to clients relying on their salesman. They shouldn’t — they are not your adviser, they are your counterparty.

This is the last I plan on discussing this topic for the foreseeable future . . .

Credit-default swaps are masquerading as financial products

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By Barry Ritholtz - March 11th, 2012, 8:36AM

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My Sunday Washington Post Business Section column is out. This morning, we look at CDS — how they became such a dangerous aspect of the financial firmament.

The print version had the full headline Credit-default swaps are masquerading as financial products. They should be regulated as insurance products. (The online version is merely Credit default swaps are insurance products. It’s time we regulated them as such.).

Here’s an excerpt from the column:

“Despite the CFMA’s horrific fatality toll, it has never been overturned. Parts of it were modified by Dodd-Frank regulations, but not the insurance exemptions. Today, these swaps are cleared through exchanges or clearinghouses — but they are still exempt from all insurance regulatory oversight. Which is bizarre, because they are little more than thinly disguised insurance products, with the CFMA kicker that there is no reserve requirement.

Which brings us more or less up to date — and onto more topical issues, such as Greece. Two weeks ago, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association said that “based on current evidence the Greek bailout would not prompt payments on the credit default swaps.”

That is an odd statement about a tradable asset — based on evidence? Typically, an option or futures contract expires, and it either is in or out of the money. Any tradable asset — stocks, bonds, futures, options, funds, etc. — settles on its own. There is a market price the asset closes at, a total volume of sales, and a final print for the day, month, quarter and year. No interpretation is required. Why on earth would anyone need a committee ruling for a trade?”

The full column goes into the tortured history of CDS.

The Post had a little fun with the dead tree version — here is the art work:
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click for ginormous version of print edition

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Source:
Credit default swaps are insurance products. It’s time we regulated them as such.
Barry Ritholtz
Washington Post, May 11 2012
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/credit-default-swaps-are-insurance-products-its-time-we-regulated-them-as-such/2012/03/05/gIQAAUo83R_story_1.html

Washington Post, May 11 2012 (PDF)

When is a Debt Default not a “Credit Event?”

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By Barry Ritholtz - March 4th, 2012, 9:00AM

In this week’s Barron’s, Alan Abelson looks askance at the non-default default in Greece.

All bombast aside, what makes this issue so fascinating to me is not whether or not Greece has or has not technically defaulted. Rather, it is that there is a committee of conflicted interested parties rendering a verdict on that issue.

Funny, that sort of group declaration is not required when a payout determination occurs when a futures contract or an option must settle.

No committee decision is required. Which (again) is why Credit Default Swaps sound a lot more like Insurance than they do other tradeable assets.

Regardless, here is Barron’s:

“Rogues lying wasn’t the problem with another recent instance of March Madness on foreign shores. A panel of five investment firms and 10 banks chosen by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association has told the world it need not fear that Greece’s failure to pay its humongous debts would trigger payments mounting into the billions of dollars on those instruments of mass destruction, credit-default swaps, thanks to those 15 worthies unanimously declaring such losses are not “a credit event.”

Keep in mind, please, that credit-default swaps presumably serve as insurance against loss for holders of bonds and sovereign debt. But the panels saw fit out of the goodness of their hearts to make an exception for Greek debt. If something that would touch off payments of over $3 billion doesn’t qualify as “a credit event,” what is it then—a walk in the park with Angela?

Barry Ritholtz of Fusion IQ reminds us in his latest dispatch of the epic credit-default-swaps folly indulged in by AIG not all that long ago when the firm wrote upwards of $3 trillion worth of them, while “reserving zero dollars against potential claims.” It provided a bonanza for the insurer until the whole house of cards collapsed. At that point, AIG went belly-up and good old Uncle Sam found himself on the hook for a bundle. As to the definitional high-jinks engaged in by the panel on Greece to avoid touching off an avalanche of credit-default payments, Barry fumes: “Damned if I can figure it out.”

Why does it matter if Credit Default Swaps are not Insurance?

The key to that question is what the state insurance regulators actually from insurers — reserves (a lot of them) to make payments in the event of any such credit event occurs. Industry groups (ISDA included) do not require reserves. Not one penny.

Why does that matter? Swaps are ALOT less profitable as an insurance product than they are as a trading vehicle. THAT is the primary issue which we all should be concerned about. Its how AIG got itself into so much trouble, and we could very well see a repeat unless this gets resolved sooner than later.

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Source:
March Madness
ALAN ABELSON
Barron’s MARCH 3, 2012
http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424052748704097904577249353146681684.html

What Are Repercussions If CDS Hedging Fails?

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By Barry Ritholtz - March 3rd, 2012, 6:00AM

The EU arranged Greek bailout proceeds apace, as everyone else awaits for the official default date (Greece has already defaulted in my book, but I am in the minority). Hedged sovereign debt investors must feel like they are waiting for their wealthy grandfather to die so they can get to the reading of the will.

I have no dog in this fight, other than than an interest in seeing derivatives, especially Credit Default Swaps, appropriately regulated as insurance products.

But the process for determining a payout for CDS is fascinating. The people officially determining defaults are not objective Judges or impartial observers; rather, a group of self-appointed traders, conflicted, biased, non transparent participants — with positions affected by their own decision –  determine what a Greek default is and isn’t.

Who is on the ISDA committee?

Bank of America Merrill Lynch
Barclays
Credit Suisse
Deutsche Bank AG
Goldman Sachs
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
Morgan Stanley
UBS
BNP Paribas
Societe Generale
Citadel Investment Group LLC
D.E. Shaw Group
BlueMountain Capital
Elliott Management Corporation
PIMCO

Again, I wonder loud: Why would one want to own something that has a payout determination made by this group of fucktards objective, ethical, unbiased committee members?

All of which raises a few issues in my mind: I do not know the answers to these questions, but they sure are intriguing:

1) Why would anyone ever buy a CDS? Do they have true intrinsic value, will they pay off like a futures contract or option? Or, must you pursue their payout via some combination of lobbying, litigation and persuasion?

2) If the answer to the prior question is “No to CDS,” then does this mean that sovereign debt cannot be hedged?

3) If that is the case, why would anyone buy any sovereign debt other than the very strongest nations? Outside of the US, China, Germany, and perhaps Switzerland, why would anyone purchase any other Sovereign debt? What do questions about hedging mean for debt issuance?

4) Which raises yet another question: If middling sovereign debt is downgraded by buyers, will these countries be forced to break out the printing presses? Might that add further pressure for the softening of the EU zone? the weaker countries be forced out of the EU zone?

5) Are we then going to see Drachmas, Lire and other forgotten currencies?

6) What does this mean for hyperinflation?

7) Lastly, what sort of a frenzy will the Gold Bugs be whipped up into?  Will they simply turn their enthusiasm into a yellow metal jihad? Are we going to see adverts in the WSJ and FT urging us to Buy Motherfucking Gold?

I do not know the answers to there queries, but they sure are fun to think about . . .

Dinallo Testimony

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By Guest Author - March 2nd, 2012, 10:00AM

Eric Dinallo’s Testimony to Congress, November 2008 on (Naked) Credit Default Swaps

Credit Default Swaps (CDS) Are Insurance Products, Not Tradeable Assets

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By Barry Ritholtz - March 2nd, 2012, 8:30AM

Our story thus far:  The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, sponsored by Texas Senator Phil Gramm as a favor to his wife Wendy (who sat on the Board of Directors of Enron, which wanted to trade energy derivatives without oversight) was rushed through Congress in 2000. Unread by Congress or their staffers, it was signed into law by President Bill Clinton on the advice of his Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers.

The CFMA radically deregulated derivatives. The law changed the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA) to exempt derivatives transactions from regulations as either “futures” (under the CEA) or “securities” under federal securities laws. Further, the CFMA specifically exempted Credit Defaults Swaps and other derivative products from regulation by any State Insurance Board or Regulators.

This rule change exempting CDS from insurance oversight led to a very specific economic behavioral change: Companies that wrote insurance had to explicitly reserve for expected losses and eventual payout in a conservative manner. Companies that wrote Credit Defaults Swaps did not.

Hence, AIG was able to underwrite over THREE TRILLION DOLLARS worth of derivatives, reserving precisely zero dollars agianst potential claims. This was enormously lucrative, except for that whole crashing & burning into insolvency thingie.

The radical deregulation the CFMA generated led directly to the collapse of AIG, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers; indirectly to the collapse of Citigroup, Bank of America, and Fannie/Freddie. It was a significant factor in the near death experiences of Goldman, Morgan Stanley and others.

Despite the horrific impact this legislation had, it was never actually overturned, only modified. Obama made the personnel error of bringing back Larry Summers (he apparently had not wrought enough damage to the nation yet). Rather than admit the error of CFMA, and overturn it, Summers instead downplayed its role. Thus, the CFMA was merely modified somewhat. The same risk the CFMA presented to the economy still exists. Swaps now must be be cleared through exchanges or clearinghouses — but they are still exempt from Insurance regulations. Which is bizarre, because they are little more than thinly disguised insurance products, with the CFMA kicker that there is no reserve requirement. Counter-parties may or may not demand one, but the dollar amount is negotiable.

Which brings us to today.

The Greek government has been declared in default by S&P; most common sense definitions of default — failing to make payments on a timely basis, declaring your intention to default, involuntary change of loan terms by borrower, etc. — have already occurred.

That last point is especially important in light of the Greek Sovereign Debt default — which International Swaps and Derivatives Association, in a nonpublic meeting of derivatives bankers, declared to be a NONDEFAULT.

I’ll be damned if I can figure out why.

Any tradeable asset — stocks, bonds, futures, options, funds, etc. — settles on its own. There is a market price the asset closes at, a total volume of sales, and a final print for the day, month, quarter and year.  No interpretation required.

Yet with Greek CDS, we have a committee of bankers, lawyers, accountants and other interested (not unbiased) parties interpreting the details, weighing the circumstances, describing what happened.

Does that sound like a tradeable asset to you?  To me, it sounds more like an insurance policy dispute. Because in reality, these CDS are in fact, nothing more than an unreserved and unregulated insurance productts.  That is the legacy of the CFMA, and one that apparently has not been overturned.

The banks, hedge funds, and securities firms who are the prime dealers of these products  greatly prefer to have their derivatives supervised by Federal regulators. Why? Because the standards they use — general safety and soundness — are empty-headed nonsense, easily evaded.

The State Insurance Boards and Regulators are far more exacting, far more specific — and require boatloads more money in reserve.

Hence, this is how the Greeks have managed to default, yet an insurance-like product will not (yet) payout. With insurers or their regulators involved, this would never have happened.

ISDA: Suckers Wanted

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By Barry Ritholtz - March 1st, 2012, 6:30PM

“The International Swaps and Derivatives Association said on Thursday that based on current evidence the Greek bailout would not prompt payments on the credit default swaps.”

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Here is a question for the crowd: Exactly how brain damaged, foolish and stupid must a trader be to ever buy one of these embarrassingly laughable instruments called derivatives?

The claim that Greece has not defaulted — despite refusing to make good on their obligations in full or on time — is utterly laughable.

In order to get paid on a default, you need a committee to evaluate whether or not failing to make payments is a — WTF?!? — default?  Even more ridiculous, the committee is composed of biased, interested parties with positions in the aforementioned securities?

ISDA: After this shitshow, why on earth would anyone EVER want to own an asset class that requires you to determine payout? Indeed, why should ANYONE ever buy a derivative again?

Fat Cats and Starving Dogs; Happy Foxes and Sad Sacks

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By Barry Ritholtz - January 22nd, 2012, 8:35AM

This weekend, I saw Margin Call on DVD. Jeremy Irons plays a CEO of a small Goldman Sachs like company.

A young analyst at the firm discovers that their highly-leveraged, massive mortgage bets are based on a VAR formula that’s flawed. It failed to consider volatility ranges beyond historical distributions. With the market swinging, his calculations show a 25% move in the underlying holdings will wipe the company out and then some.

Irons ends up giving a speech to Kevin Spacey towards the end of the film — no spoilers here — its just a fascinating digression, that goes something like this:

“Its just money; its made up. Pieces of paper with pictures on it so we don’t have to kill each other just to get something to eat. It’s not wrong. And it’s certainly no different today than its ever been. 1637, 1797, 1819, 37, 57, 84, 1901, 07, 29, 1937, 1974, 1987 — Jesus, didn’t that fuck up me up good — 92, 97, 2000 and whatever we want to call this [2008].

It’s all just the same thing over and over; we can’t help ourselves. And you and I can’t control it, or stop it, or even slow it. Or even ever-so-slightly alter it. We just react. And we make a lot money if we get it right. And we get left by the side of the side of the road if we get it wrong.

And there have always been and there always will be the same percentage of winners and losers. Happy foxes and sad sacks. Fat cats and starving dogs in this world. Yeah, there may be more of us today than there’s ever been. But the percentages-they stay exactly the same.”

Its a great film (IMDB) — if you have not seen it yet, move it to the top of your Netflix queue . .  .

Re-hypothecation: How it’s related to MF Global

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By Barry Ritholtz - January 5th, 2012, 5:00AM

Marketplace Whiteboard:

If ever there was a word that you’d expect to find in a Harry Potter  novel, it’s re-hypothecation. This a classic example of financial  people inventing impenetrable terminology to make their business look  like a black art. “Oooh, re-hypothecation, it must be magic!”

Well it isn’t.

The term “re-hypothecation” came up a lot during the MF Global meltdown; It’s quite a common term in the securities market – but what does it mean?

To explain re-hypothecation, we have to explain hypothecation. And  hypothecation is pretty simple. It’s when you lend someone money and let  the borrower keep the collateral.

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Source:
Re-hypothecation: How it’s related to MF Global
Paddy Hirsch
Marketplace Jan 4, 2012
http://www.marketplace.org/topics/business/whiteboard/re-hypothecation-how-its-related-mf-global

MBIA vs BAC: On why the loss causation ruling is important

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By Guest Author - January 3rd, 2012, 4:32PM

“Bank of America Corp. may face billions of dollars more in liability for faulty mortgages if a judge agrees with insurer MBIA Inc. that the lender must buy back loans even if the errors didn’t cause a borrower’s default…If New York Supreme Court Justice Eileen Bransten and judges in similar cases across the country rule that the issue of “causation” doesn’t apply — meaning it’s enough to show that the loan was improperly made — it “could significantly impact” Bank of America’s potential costs, the bank said in a regulatory filing this month…

Such court defeats may add as much as $9 billion to what Bank of America owes bond insurers, according to hedge fund Branch Hill Capital, which is betting against its stock and has invested in MBIA. A victory for Armonk, New York-based MBIA may also strengthen claims by mortgage-securities investors…“You don’t have to wait until you’re in a severe accident before you return the car with bad brakes,” said David Grais…

The decision may intensify settlement talks between bond insurers like MBIA and other banks that issued securities based on faulty mortgages, according to the head of insurer Assured Guaranty Ltd., which is demanding money from lenders including UBS AG and Credit Suisse Group AG…

“If they lose that case, then our certainty of getting reimbursed becomes a lot higher,” Dominic Frederico, Assured’s chief executive officer, said in an interview…

Since the start of 2010, Bank of America’s cushion for future losses on repurchases of mortgages that never matched their promised quality has ballooned from $4 billion to $17.8 billion even as it made payments in settlements with debt guarantors such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government- supported mortgage giants…

Its reserves and guidance on how much more it may need are based on several assumptions, though, including the company’s view that losses will only have to be reimbursed if it can be proven “that the alleged representations and warranties breach was the cause of the loss,” the bank said in the Aug. 4 filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. If courts disagree, “it could significantly impact” the estimate of as much as $5 billion in additional liabilities…

“It could change the playing field,” MBIA Chief Executive Officer Jay Brown said on an Aug. 10 conference call with analysts and investors when asked about the causation issue. It could “have a very significant effect on the ability to rescind or obtain recessionary damages,” he said. “So, it can affect the view of both parties as to the likely outcome of the trial.”…

In December, Justice Bransten denied Bank of America’s bid to prevent MBIA from using reviews of samples of loans in the case, rather than requiring reviews of every individual mortgage in dispute. The ruling may add to the threats facing Bank of America by encouraging suits, according to the SEC filing…

Bank of America needs to set aside between $10.6 billion and $44.4 billion more to cover losses on soured mortgages sold to or insured by others, said Chris Gamaitoni, a Compass Point Research and Trading LLC analyst…

MBIA’s lawyers at Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP are also arguing that insurance law should allow it to win against Bank of America on breach-of-contract and fraud claims without proving causation…The causation issue alone may add $8 billion to $9 billion of liabilities from bond insurers, said Manal Mehta, a partner at Branch Hill Capital in San Francisco…

“That is probably as important as the statistical sampling ruling,” Mehta said. “It would take away one of Countrywide’s key defenses and significantly accelerate the timetable for litigation.”…Bank of America, in its talks with 22 of the world’s largest debt investors, argued that any loan repurchase would require loss causation be proven, according to a filing in New York state court of an expert opinion by Brian Lin, a managing director at RRMS Advisors. Those negotiations led to the proposed $8.5 billion settlement…

Lin said a settlement between $8.8 billion and $11 billion would be reasonable, relying in part on an assumption that investors would be successful in getting Bank of America to repurchase only 40 percent of misrepresented loans…

Lin was hired by Bank of New York Mellon Corp., the bonds’ trustee that is seeking approval for the accord.”

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