Posts filed under “Legal”

How Long til Madoff Losses Are Recovered ?

Earlier today, we looked at the NYT interactive graphic that calculates how long it will take to return to breakeven for typical portfolio losses.

But what if you were one of 8000 Madoff investors, and your portfolio is now worth zero?

For starters, you should get $500k from SIPIC. Then, there is the $830 million of liquid assets of the firm; that will be returned pro-rata to investors.

So if you had $10 million with Madoff, and its now worth close to zero, and you contribute $10,000 per month and earn 10% per year, it will only take 18 years to get your original 10 million back.

>

>

>>

>

UPDATE JANUARY 8 2009 1:21PM

Madoff Had More Than $173 Million in Checks

Federal prosecutors said Thursday that investigators who searched Bernard Madoff’s office desk after the money manager’s arrest on Dec. 11 found about 100 signed checks totaling more than $173 million.


Source:
Calculate Your Financial Comeback
NYT, January 6, 2009

http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/01/06/business/20090106-comeback-graphic.html

Category: Investing, Legal, Markets, Regulation

Former NAR Economist David Lereah is a Jackass

Alternative Title: David Lereah: Even More Full of Shit Than Previously Believed > Of all the various parties who contributed to the boom and bust in housing and credit, none have escaped more unscathed than the National Association of Realtors, and their former Baghdad-Bob-in-Chief, David Lereah. The NAR turned a blind eye to fraud amongst…Read More

Category: Contrary Indicators, Legal, Real Estate, Really, really bad calls

Inside Look: Madoff Mayhem

Analysis and Discussion with University of Rochester President Joel Seligman, Also an SEC Historian

January 03, 2009

Featuring Interview with Former SEC Official Jacob Frenkel

January 02, 2009

Category: Legal, Regulation, Video

How to Repair a Broken Financial World

Here is another excerpt — part II — of the all consuming OpEd of the Sunday New York Times by Michael Lewis and David Einhorn: Excerpt: When Bear Stearns failed, the government induced JPMorgan Chase to buy it by offering a knockdown price and guaranteeing Bear Stearns’s shakiest assets. Bear Stearns bondholders were made whole…Read More

Category: Bailouts, Credit, Derivatives, Legal, Markets, Really, really bad calls, Regulation

The End of the Financial World As We Know It (and I feel fine)

The entire OpEd section of the Sunday New York Times has been taken over by an article jointly written by Michael Lewis and David Einhorn, titled The End of the Financial World As We Know It. Its this morning’s must read piece . . . Excerpt: “OUR financial catastrophe, like Bernard Madoff’s pyramid scheme, required…Read More

Category: Bailouts, Credit, Derivatives, Legal, Really, really bad calls, Regulation

Here Come the Cram Downs!

Nice column to end the year on via WSJ: Mortgage ‘Cram-Downs’ Loom as Foreclosures Mount. Excerpt: “The banking industry hoped the mortgage “cram-down” measure died when Congress removed it from the $700 billion bailout bill that passed in October. But it has been gathering momentum in Democrat-controlled Washington, as evidence emerges that current voluntary foreclosure-prevention…Read More

Category: Credit, Legal, Real Estate

“If you were dead, they would still give you a loan”

“It was the Wild West. If you were alive, they would give you a loan. Actually, I think if you were dead, they would still give you a loan.”

-Steven M. Knobel, a founder of appraisal firm Mitchell, Maxwell & Jackson

>

Interesting article in the Sunday NYTimes about WaMu, the company that could not say no. The Times missed a golden opportunity to proclaim a major bank a “slut” – any opportunity one gets to do so should be taken without hesitation.

And just how slutty were WaMu’s loans? By the first half of this year, the value of its bad lending had reached $11.5 billion. Here’s why:

WaMu pressed sales agents to pump out loans while disregarding borrowers’ incomes and assets, according to former employees. The bank set up what insiders described as a system of dubious legality that enabled real estate agents to collect fees of more than $10,000 for bringing in borrowers, sometimes making the agents more beholden to WaMu than they were to their clients.

WaMu gave mortgage brokers handsome commissions for selling the riskiest loans, which carried higher fees, bolstering profits and ultimately the compensation of the bank’s executives. WaMu pressured appraisers to provide inflated property values that made loans appear less risky, enabling Wall Street to bundle them more easily for sale to investors.

Why the disregard for traditional lending standards, the risky mortgages, the lending to unqualified people? Was it the CRA or Fannie/Freddie? To the contrary, it was a relentless drive for sales volume and market share. Loan officers were givens 100s of new loans per day, ensuring  review and oversight were minimal. Investigating into loan apps was actively discouraged.

I know from personal experience that WaMu was amongst a group of predatory lenders and mortgage felons who actively misrepresented loans. I have disagreed with those who called the no doc loans predatory borrowing. It was the banks that actively misrepresented the loan products to borrowers; It was the banks that had the fiduciary obligation to their depositors and investors not to engage in reckless lending.

My wife has a WaMu account, and we got a sales pitch on mortgages from them in 2004, and again when we sold one house and bought another in 2006. I am pretty savvy about mortgages, and I was aghast about their Option ARM and their Neg Am sales pitch. I spoke with several WaMu salespeople — in person in a NYC branch, and over the phone — and they tried to make the teaser rate sound like this was a non-resetting, permanent payment. If you pressed them about the reset, they would eventually fess up. If you asked them about Neg Am, they never explained the total amount owed went up every month you underpaid principle. But if you were naive about finance or didn’t understand how these loans worked, they steamrolled right over you.

Here’s the ugliness:

The ARM Loan Niche:  WaMu’s retail mortgage office in Downey, Calif., specialized in selling option ARMs to Latino customers who spoke little [or no] English and depended on advice from real estate brokers, according to a former sales agent who requested anonymity because he was still in the mortgage business.

According to that agent, WaMu turned real estate agents into a pipeline for loan applications by enabling them to collect “referral fees” for clients who became WaMu borrowers.

Buyers were typically oblivious to agents’ fees, the agent said, and agents rarely explained the loan terms. “Their Realtor was their trusted friend,” the agent said. “The Realtors would sell them on a minimum payment, and that was an outright lie.”

This is predatory lending. The FBI, which has already arrested over 1000 people, should be hunting for all of these dirtbags, clawback any and all commissions from them — then toss them in jail.

And again, what some have termed “predatory borrowing” was in the real world, simply fraud perpetrated by bank employees and mortgage brokers: “[Managers] in the Irvine, Calif, office coached brokers to leave parts of applications blank to avoid prompting verification if the borrower’s job or income was sketchy.”

I’ve mentioned this many times before: Many of the people who have 2/28 ARMs had no idea they had a mortgage that was going to reset. I’ve spoken to many people who had no idea, and remain convinced its a paper work error. From what I personally saw from the sales staff at WaMu, this was not an accident.

Excerpt after the jump . . .

Read More

Category: Bailouts, Corporate Management, Credit, Legal, Real Estate

Inside Look: Spotting the Next Madoff

Interview with James Hedges of LJH Global Investments

Category: Legal, Markets, Video

Security Fraud Prosecutions Down 87% Since 2000

Some toothless watchdog: This year, the S.E.C. has brought the fewest number of securities fraud prosecutions since 1991. That’s according to the data that the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), a research group at Syracuse University, has amassed. Soft on White Collar Crime, by the Numbers: • 2008 had 133 prosecutions for securities fraud (thru…Read More

Category: Bailouts, Legal, Markets, Regulation

Office of Thrift Supervision: Asshat Central

I am trying to figure out who is the biggest jerk in this story. It is a challenge, given the collection of utter clowns and ne’er-do-wells that run that office.

First, you have some moron who helped cost the taxpayers a hundred large ($100B) back in the 1980s. How this idiot ever ended up in a position of responsibility in any regulatory agency again is beyond my comprehension. There are some who would point to all government regulation as the root cause, but crony capitalism and the disbelief in and and all regulations is what leads to putting someone so unsuitable in this position of authority.

Second, you have to wonder about just how frickin’ dumb the idiots who run the office of Thrift Supervision have been the past 8 years. These were the clowns that blamed Schumer for the collapse of Indy Mac, after backdating their capital levels.  As you will see below, if the OTS weren’t incompetant boobs, Indy Mac should have been shut down months before their run!

That the OTS is run by such half-wits and morons, that they blamed a US Senator — for having the temerity to ask how much money the criminally incompetant managers running Indy Mac were going to cost the taxpayer — rather than their own inadequate supervision. (BTW, the answer to Schumer’s question was about $9 billion).

Recall that when James Gilleran took over the Office of Thrift Supervision, he took a chainsaw to a stack of regulations to symbolize how his agency was going to “cut red tape” for thrifts (a.k.a. S&Ls), which were heavily involved in mortgage lending. The ideologue in him declared: “Our goal is to allow thrifts to operate with a wide breadth of freedom from regulatory intrusion,” Gilleran said in a 2004 speech.

Nice work.

This wasn’t mere malfeasance by Gilleran — as we have been repeatedly noting, it was nonfeasance — the intentional failure to perform a required legal duty or obligation.

As for the FBI, the division in charge of enforcement, after sounding the warning bell, subsequently made a “strategic alliance” in 2007 with the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) the trade association for (then) major industry players like IndyMac and Countrywide Financial. Imagine if the FBI division in charge of organized crime set up a joint venture with the Cosa Nostra. That’s what this was the equivalent of at the FBI.

It all comes back to the radical deregulatory philosophy we discussed Sunday:  Appoint cabinet level people who share that same belief system, who think government can never work — and voila! –  this is what you get.

Anyone who thinks that really bad behavior in the corporate world needs no proscribing should not be put in charge of Regulatory agencies.

Excerpts after the jump . . .

Read More

Category: Corporate Management, Legal, Markets, Regulation