Posts filed under “Regulation”
What follows is the Harry Markopolos complaint to the SEC, circa November 2005, identifying 29 red flags that Madoff was a fraud. This highly detailed complaint was filed regarding the apparent Fraud at Madoff Securities.
It was ignored by the Christopher Cox SEC, which was too busy concocting schemes to dismantle the SEC rather than investigate complaints such as this.
Cox “Worked to Dismantle The SEC,” Says Commission Vet
TPM Muckraker, December 19, 2008, 1:32PM
Madoff Misled SEC in ’06, Got Off
GREGORY ZUCKERMAN and KARA SCANNELL
WSJ, DECEMBER 18, 2008
Consider that one year ago Royal Bank of Scotland paid US$100 billion for ABN Amro. That seemingly impossible amount would now buy: Citibank $22,5 billion (74% down) Morgan Stanley $10,5 billion (-72%) Goldman Sachs $21 billion (-67%) Merril Lynch $12,3 billion (-77%) Deutsche Bank $13 billion (-71%) Barclays $12,7 billion (-71%) And still leave $8…Read More
Today’s NYT (and Monday’s WSJ) each have articles which compare Madoff investors with those of recent $400 million dollar hedge fund fraud Bayou Group. I believe this misunderstands the applicable law of partnership, fraud, and investing. Hedge fund investors are limited partners, and as such, they have a fiduciary duty to their other partners. Regardless…Read More
With everyone tsk-tsking the Madoff scandal — the amount lost, the after-the-fact obviousness, the SEC incompetence — I thought now was as good a time as any to look at the actual research, due diligence and manpower thrown at investigating managers and funds. Not surprisingly, it is tiny — at least, when compared with the…Read More
Atkins was republican SEC commissioner from 2002 to 2008; Cox says SEC failed to act on allegations against Madoff; Investors lost up to $50 billion in Madoff’s alleged scheme; Analysis by Paul Atkins, Former SEC Commissioner
The Madoff Scandal – Interview with Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt
Here’s an excerpt from Bailout Nation, about a subject under much discussion today: The incompetence of the S.E.C.
Part IV: Market Failure
Chapter 14. Casting Blame
Over the course of two terms, Bush appointed three SEC Chairmen, each ill-suited for the position. It was a veritable parade of poor choices for the role of regulating stock markets. His first appointment, Harvey Pitt, was a securities industry defense attorney and was wholly unsuited to the position. Instead of representing the interests of investors, Pitt was an industry lapdog. Pitt pledged a “kinder and gentler” SEC just when the opposite was needed in the midst of a huge run of corporate misfeasance.
In an era of corporate accounting scandals, Pitt had close ties to the accounting industry. And for inexplicable reasons, Pitt met with the heads of companies under active SEC investigation. As a Wall Street lawyer, Pitt had “recommended that clients destroy sensitive documents before they could be used against them – advice that seemed to find echoes in the SEC’s investigations into Enron and its shredder-happy auditor, Arthur Andersen.” Pitt had to recuse himself from many of the SEC’s votes — they were frequently about the clients he had represented as a defense attorney. By July of 2002, Senator (and future GOP presidential candidate) John McCain was calling for Pitt’s resignation.
Pitt, not surprisingly, demoralized the agency. To investor advocacy groups, having Pitt as SEC chief was like putting Osama bin Laden in charge of Homeland Security.
The next SEC Chairman Bush appointed was William Donaldson. He is the one who allowed the net-cap rule to be exempted for the five biggest banks in 2004. Instead of 12 to 1 leverage, banks levered up 30 and even 40 to 1 after the waiver. It isn’t glib to say the financial meltdown was three times as bad as it might have been for Donaldson’s SEC agreeing to this waiver. It would be charitable to call his chairmanship undistinguished.
Implicated in a $50 billion Ponzi scheme, at a 2007 roundtable discussion with Justin Fox, Ailsa Roell, Robert A. Schwartz, Muriel Seibert, and Josh Stampfli.
These are some excerpts featuring Madoff, recently implicated in a $50 billion Ponzi scheme.
The full video is here
I have no special insight into the Madoff story.
However, my spidey sense is tingling.
Consider this: Running a billion dollar Ponzi scheme has to be very time consuming. Running a $50 billion Ponzi scheme by yourself, at age 70?
I don’t think it can be done.
Just generating the phony transaction receipts is a full time job. How did this son-of-a-bitch do it all by himself? Madoff HAD TO HAVE HELP.
I simply cannot believe he did it himself, all alone. His entire scheme was predicated upon finding another 1% of assets every month to payout to the prior investors. Between raising moeny and running operations, it was more than a 1 man job.
And when the market hit the skids and topped out so fast — it fell much quicker in 2008 than in 2000 — he ran out of manuevering room. Madoff had to know he was going down, and everyone who was working with him — everyone who knew of the scheme — they were going down, too.
So he confessed — TO HIS SONS. AND THEY TURNED HIM IN.
And Bloomberg reports they are already represented by Martin Flumenbaum, a lawyer.
Maybe I’ve read one too many detective novels, but consider this strictly hypothetical, based on-no-facts whatsoever, wildly imaginative hypothesis: If I were running a $50 billion Ponzi scheme, I would have to bring in someone close to help me with it.
Who is closer than my family?
When it became clear there was no where else to turn, instead of bringing down the entire dynasty, I would have them turn me in, to protect the family and what left of the legacy.
I would take the fall so they wouldn’t have to.
As I noted, I have no special facts, no insight into this what-so-ever. Other than the story we have been fed so far doesn’t make any sense.
Who was Madoff’s accomplices? I have no idea, but there has to be some! If I were the SEC, I would be looking over close friends and family closely. Very, very closely.
“Since the financial meltdown, people have been asking, ‘Where was Congress? Why didn’t they see this coming? Why didn’t they provide better oversight?’ And the answer for some, including Senator Schumer, is that they were actually too busy pursuing a deregulatory agenda. Their focus was on how we have to lighten up regulation on Wall…Read More
> Go to NakedShorts and read the entire 2001 article of the various ways some people challenged the Madoff story: > If it sounds too good to be true… > UPDATE: Paul points to this Barrons story from 2001 Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Barron’s MAY 7, 2001 http://online.barrons.com/article/SB989019667829349012.html >