Posts filed under “Think Tank”
Today’s chart illustrates how the recent plunge in earnings has impacted the current valuation of the stock market as measured by the price to earnings ratio (PE ratio). Generally speaking, when the PE ratio is high, stocks are considered to be expensive. When the PE ratio is low, stocks are considered to be inexpensive. From 1936 into the late 1980s, the PE ratio tended to peak in the low 20s (red line) and trough somewhere around seven (green line).
The price investors were willing to pay for a dollar of earnings increased during the dot-com boom (late 1990s) and the dot-com bust (early 2000s). As a result of the recent plunge in earnings and recent stock market rally, the PE ratio spiked and just peaked at 144 – a record high. Currently, with 97% of US corporations having reported for Q2 2009, the PE ratio now stands at a lofty 129.
Source: Chart of the Day
> Is Bernanke purposely aiding & abetting the usual market manipulation that occurs during expiration week? In July, Ben poured $80.2B into the system, mostly by monetizing MBS, during expiration week, igniting a huge rally. The Fed balance sheet contracted for most of June and July before Ben’s gambit. For the week ended Wednesday, Ben…Read More
“Memories, like the corners of my mind. Misty water colored memories, of the Way We Were,” sang Barbra Streisand and I’ll be humming the song as Bernanke gives a speech today titled “Reflections on a Year of Crisis” at 10am from Jackson Hole. Unfortunately the trip down memory lane won’t begin in mid ’03 when…Read More
J.D. Power and Associates today is quantifying in their estimation the impact on auto sales this year due to the clunker program and the extent that it steals sales from 2010. They said that based on data seen thus far, August will see the first 1mm+ unit sales (includes fleet sales) month since last year….Read More
My father Richard Whalen was a long time friend and contemporary of Robert Novak, whose funeral is tomorrow in Washington. I knew Bob and his family growing up in Washington and even went on some memorable fishing trips off of Ocean City, MD. Dad wrote the following remembrance of Bob earlier this week. — Chris
By Richard Whalen
I knew Bob Novak for almost fifty years. I first met him in Washington, D.C. when he was a member of the Wall Street Journal Washington’s bureau and I was a New York based Wall Street Journal editorial writer assigned to write an editorial page article on Republican politics. Bob, defending his Washington turf, asked me what I was doing in DC. After shouting at each other, we had a drink and then another and a third and by that time, Bob helped me outline my piece. We became great friends – best friends.
As the media elite emerged as part of Washington’s permanent government in the 1970s, Bob was at the center of it, but he resisted the social phoniness like a true son of the working class from Joliet, IL. He was determined to keep the realistic perspective of his father, an intelligent small businessman who was quietly proud of his celebrated son. .Bob was in the special category occupied earlier by Arthur Krock, David Lawrence and Walter Lippmann. He was not a pundit but a hard-nosed, hard-working, shoe leather reporter whose sources ranged wider and deeper than anybody else’s. He distilled truth from depths of fresh reporting.
Category: Think Tank
Via Bob Bronson, we get this very interesting way to think about the potential universe of market returns: In addition to the almost universally improper use of the correlation function that we have presented before (our Correlation Puzzle is available on request), Alpha-Beta, Efficient Frontier, Black Scholes, VaR, stochastic modeling, and exotic derivatives from Modern…Read More
The August Philly Fed survey came in at +4.2, above the consensus of -2.0, up from -7.5 in July and follows the unexpected gain in the Empire survey seen on Monday. It’s the first positive reading since September ’08 and is at the highest level since November ’07. The data measures the direction of improvement,…Read More
Initial Jobless Claims totaled 576k, 26k more than expected and up 15k from the prior week which was revised up by 3k. This brings the 4 week average up to 570k from 566k. Continuing Claims were 26k more than estimated and up 2k from last week. The insured unemployment rate was 4.7%, unchanged with the…Read More
Good Evening: Just when it looked as if the U.S. stock market would resume the Friday/Monday slide today, share prices pulled out of a morning nosedive to finish higher for a second straight session. Rising energy prices and a falling dollar both aided this light volume turnaround, with the latter receiving quite a bit of…Read More
Below is the latest comment from the Institutional Risk Analyst. My former Fed colleague Dick Alford came up with the idea, then Dennis and I revised and extended. Enjoy and have a great August. — Chris
Systemic Risk: Is it Black Swans or Market Innovations?
The Institutional Risk Analyst
August 18, 2009
“Whatever you think you know about the distribution changes the distribution.”
American Enterprise Institute
In this week’s issue of The IRA, our friend and colleague Richard Alford, a former Fed of New York economist, and IRA founders Dennis Santiago and Chris Whalen, ask us whether we really see Black Swans in market crisis or our own expectations. Of note, we will release our preliminary Q2 Banking Stress Index ratings on Monday, August 24, 2009. As with Q1, these figures represent about 90% of all FDIC insured depositories, but exclude the largest money center banks (aka the “Stress Test Nineteen”), thus providing a look at the state of the regional and community banks as of the quarter ended June 30, 2009. Click here to register for The Institutional Risk Analyst or request a trial for our products.
Many popular explanations of recent financial crises cite “Black Swan” events; extreme, unexpected, “surprise” price movements, as the causes of the calamity. However, in looking at our crisis wracked markets, we might consider that the Black Swan hypothesis doesn’t fit the facts as well an alternative explanation: namely that the speculative outburst of financial innovation and the artificially low, short-run interest rate environment pursued by the Federal Open Market Committee, combined to change the underlying distribution of potential price changes. This shift in the composition of the distribution made likely outcomes that previously seemed impossible or remote. This shift in possible outcomes, in turn, generated surprise in the markets and arguably led to the emergence of “systemic risk” as a metaphor to explain these apparent “anomalies.”
But were the failures of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual or the other “rare” events really anomalous? Or are we just making excuses for our collective failure to identify and manage risk?
The choice of which hypothesis to ultimately accept in developing the narrative description of the causation of the financial crisis has strategic implications for understanding as well as reducing the likelihood of future crisis, including the effect on the safety and soundness of financial institutions. To us, the hard work is not trying to specifically limit the range of possibilities with artificial assumptions, but to model risk when you must assume as a hard rule, like the rules which govern the physical sciences, that the event distribution is in constant flux.