

Market Focus

Global Strategy

Double Dips Are Hard To Find

Contributors
 Jonathan Wilmot
 +44 20 7888 3807
jonathan.wilmot@credit-suisse.com

James Sweeney
 +1 212 538 4648
james.sweeney@credit-suisse.com

Matthias Klein
 +1 212 325 1790
matthias.klein@credit-suisse.com

Aimi Plant
 +44 20 7888 7054
aimi.plant@credit-suisse.com

- True double dip recessions are so rare as to be an almost extinct species, though you would not know it from the market chatter of recent weeks.
- To illustrate, we look at the level of US industrial production since 1884. We can only find three recessions out of 38 that seem to qualify as true double dips: one in the late 1880s, 1913/1914 and 1980-1982, though that is usually defined as two back to back recessions. See Exhibits 1 to 3.
- Moreover, these double dips occurred when the initial contraction was rather mild. There is no example of a double dip recession after severe downturns or banking panics, despite a huge variety of underlying circumstances.
- That is no coincidence: we believe the natural forces of recovery are much stronger and more self-reinforcing than often supposed, even when unemployment and spare capacity are very high.
- Indeed, the room for recovery is especially great when the output gap is large, because this normally means private sector savings rates have recently spiked up very sharply and can fall substantially as confidence, profits and income growth rebuild.
- This is very much the case now: the private sector financial balance (households plus non-financial corporations) soared by 8% of GDP in the US during the Lehman panic, by 10% of GDP in the UK and about 4.5% of GDP in the eurozone. That is huge, and totally unprecedented in modern times.
- The scope for lower private savings (reduced cash hoarding) is therefore very large, and should itself be the main driver of shrinking public sector deficits.
- It is tempting – but trite – to expect a tepid recovery by focusing only on the need for public sector austerity. The excuse is that it can be very hard to predict precisely private savings behaviour, while fiscal action is usually well telegraphed. Still, overemphasizing the impact of government action simply because it is easy to forecast is lazy economics.
- Conflating slower growth momentum with a double dip won't win you the Nobel Prize either. Recoveries follow a well rehearsed rhythm, with the first burst of production growth typically very fast and the first momentum peak occurring between 6 and 15 months from the output trough¹. Almost without exception. As you can see by glancing through charts 1-3 and 16-21.
- In this recovery, we estimate that global IP momentum peaked around 15% p.a. at the start of this year – the highest level since the 1975 recovery. We believe the US will have a double peak in March and July around 11% p.a., a function of the winter snowstorms rather than fundamental forces. Chinese IP momentum on our measure peaked at over 30% p.a. in July/August 2009, and has halved since then, even as the level of output continues to expand.

¹ See also "Quantum of Volatility" by Neal Soss : http://research-and-analytics.csfb.com/DocumentViewer?language=ENG&format=PDF&document_section=1&document_id=855455101

- Continued expansion at a slower pace is the typical pattern after the first momentum peak: US production rose by between 3 and 7.5% in the 12 months after the first momentum peak in six of the last seven recoveries.
- 1980 is the sole exception, and illustrates the potential truth behind what one might call the double dip delusion: when final demand is hit by a major new exogenous shock, then a second recession can occur unusually soon.
- In fact, before WW I, when banking panics were a regular occurrence relatively short intervals between recessions were the norm. There were no less than 10 recessions in the 30 years to 1914, including our first two true double dip episodes. But production reached new highs in each genuine recovery and trend growth was quite rapid i.e. growth was volatile but fast.
- We think it is very possible that future recessions might occur more frequently than we have been used to, reflecting more limited scope for private and public sector debt growth. But nothing in the historic record suggests a new recession is likely now: on the contrary it suggests once recovery starts to establish itself, it is not that easy to derail.
- Even in the pre WW I period a peak in equity markets was much more likely to occur around 28 months from the trough than after a mere 12-15 months, putting us nearer July 2011. For production, two of the post-panic recoveries peaked around two years after the production trough, also suggesting next summer. See charts 8-10.
- But history will mean nothing if some large new shock to final demand occurs very early in the recovery process: if it does the economy will likely contract again.
- Despite the rhetoric we have seen nothing in terms of concrete plans for fiscal tightening (outside the European periphery) which suggests that fiscal policy will deliver such a shock. Europe and banking reform are the two more legitimate concerns, in our view. A disorderly break-up or default within the eurozone in the near future would clearly have a very negative effect on bank capital positions – raising the spectre of another round of rapid balance sheet contraction – and on business confidence. Clumsy and punitive re-regulation of the banking sector could have the same result.
- We are in little doubt that a new and substantial forced contraction of financial sector balance sheets would be more like the 1930s when debt deflation was allowed to get an unstoppable grip as a result of major policy errors, (passage of the Smoot-Hawley Act in June 1930, and the Fed's sharp tightening of monetary policy in 1931 after the UK left the gold standard).
- Today, any new shock leading to bank balance sheet contraction and weaker growth could in turn lead to more bad loans and market losses within the financial sector, making it even tougher to raise new equity capital just when capital requirements are being raised, forcing further contraction and economic weakness etc. In these circumstances, even modest fiscal tightening would be madness, in our view. This would be a truly deflationary vicious circle.
- So we believe the immediate issue for investors is not whether there will be a "double dip" recession but whether policy errors will (inadvertently) create or allow a double dip "depression". (Snatching defeat from the jaws of victory).
- Our view on this is very simple: it is just about possible but not very likely. Whatever populist tendencies may drive congress or members of parliament, the most senior leaders within the G-20 – and this very much includes the Chinese – are aware of the risks, including to their political future.
- For markets to be freed from the paralysis induced by fear of a low probability but extremely bad outcome, we will need to see the final shape of US banking reform (the President wants to sign this on the 4th July) and a viable support package for Spain, (with or without use of the EFSF). More likely within weeks than months.
- Meanwhile, we hope that our mini-chartbook below will persuade you that double dips are very rare birds indeed – much talked about but seldom seen.

Exhibit 1: US IP (log level) with Recessions Marked 1884-1925




Exhibit 2: US IP (log level) with Recessions Marked 1925-1970





Exhibit 3: US IP (log level) with Recessions Marked 1970-Now



Source: Credit Suisse

Exhibit 4: US Real Equity Returns (log level) and US IP Momentum 1884-1925




Exhibit 5: US Real Equity Returns (log level) and US IP Momentum 1925-1970





Exhibit 6: US Real Equity Returns (log level) and US IP Momentum 1970-Now



Source: Credit Suisse

Exhibit 7: US Real Equity Returns (log level) and Global IP Momentum 1970-Now




Exhibit 8: US Real Equity Returns: Average Recovery (1884-1914) vs. Current





Exhibit 9: US Real Equity Returns: Average Recovery (1945-Now) vs. Current



Source: Credit Suisse

Exhibit 10: US IP Post-Panic Recoveries




Exhibit 11: US IP Post-War Recoveries





Exhibit 12: US IP Post-Depression Recoveries



Source: Credit Suisse

Exhibit 13: US IP Post-Recession Recoveries




Exhibit 14: Severe Contractions and Rebounds in US IP





Exhibit 15: Double-Dip Cycles in US IP



Source: Credit Suisse

Exhibit 16: US IP Momentum during Post-Panic Recoveries




Exhibit 17: US IP Momentum during Post-War Recoveries





Exhibit 18: US IP Momentum during Post-Depression Recoveries



Source: Credit Suisse

Exhibit 19: US IP Momentum during Post-Recession Recoveries




Exhibit 20: US IP Momentum during Post-Recession Recoveries





Exhibit 21: Global IP Momentum during Post-Recession Recoveries



Source: Credit Suisse

FIXED INCOME GLOBAL STRATEGY RESEARCH

Jonathan Wilmot, Managing Director
Chief Global Strategist
+44 20 7888 3807

Lara Warner, Managing Director
Global Head of Fixed Income and Economic Research
+1 212 538 4804

LONDON

One Cabot Square, London E14 4QJ, United Kingdom

Paul McGinnie, Director

44 20 7883 6481
paul.mcginnie@credit-suisse.com

Aimi Plant, Associate

44 20 7888 7054
aimi.plant@credit-suisse.com

Wenzhe Zhao, Analyst

44 20 7883 8189
wenzhe.zhao@credit-suisse.com

NEW YORK

11 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10010

James Sweeney, Director

1 212 538 4648
james.sweeney@credit-suisse.com

Matthias Klein, Vice President

1 212 325 1790
matthias.klein@credit-suisse.com

Disclosure Appendix

Analyst Certification

Jonathan Wilmot, James Sweeney, Matthias Klein and Aimi Plant each certify, with respect to the companies or securities that he or she analyzes, that (1) the views expressed in this report accurately reflect his or her personal views about all of the subject companies and securities and (2) no part of his or her compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this report.

Important Disclosures

Credit Suisse's policy is only to publish investment research that is impartial, independent, clear, fair and not misleading. For more detail, please refer to Credit Suisse's Policies for Managing Conflicts of Interest in connection with Investment Research: http://www.csfb.com/research-and-analytics/disclaimer/managing_conflicts_disclaimer.html

Credit Suisse's policy is to publish research reports as it deems appropriate, based on developments with the subject issuer, the sector or the market that may have a material impact on the research views or opinions stated herein.

The analyst(s) involved in the preparation of this research report received compensation that is based upon various factors, including Credit Suisse's total revenues, a portion of which are generated by Credit Suisse's Investment Banking and Fixed Income Divisions.

Credit Suisse may trade as principal in the securities or derivatives of the issuers that are the subject of this report.

At any point in time, Credit Suisse is likely to have significant holdings in the securities mentioned in this report.

As at the date of this report, Credit Suisse acts as a market maker or liquidity provider in the debt securities of the subject issuer(s) mentioned in this report.

For important disclosure information on securities recommended in this report, please visit the website at <https://researchdisclosure.credit-suisse.com> or call +1-212-538-7625.

For the history of any relative value trade ideas suggested by the Fixed Income research department as well as fundamental recommendations provided by the Emerging Markets Sovereign Strategy Group over the previous 12 months, please view the document at http://research-and-analytics.csfb.com/docpopup.asp?ctbdocid=330703_1_en. Credit Suisse clients with access to the Locus website may refer to <http://www.credit-suisse.com/locus>.

For the history of recommendations provided by Technical Analysis, please visit the website at <http://www.credit-suisse.com/techanalysis>.

Credit Suisse does not provide any tax advice. Any statement herein regarding any US federal tax is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, by any taxpayer for the purposes of avoiding any penalties.

Emerging Markets Bond Recommendation Definitions

Buy: Indicates a recommended buy on our expectation that the issue will deliver a return higher than the risk-free rate.

Sell: Indicates a recommended sell on our expectation that the issue will deliver a return lower than the risk-free rate.

Corporate Bond Fundamental Recommendation Definitions

Buy: Indicates a recommended buy on our expectation that the issue will be a top performer in its sector.

Outperform: Indicates an above-average total return performer within its sector. Bonds in this category have stable or improving credit profiles and are undervalued, or they may be weaker credits that, we believe, are cheap relative to the sector and are expected to outperform on a total-return basis. These bonds may possess price risk in a volatile environment.

Market Perform: Indicates a bond that is expected to return average performance in its sector.

Underperform: Indicates a below-average total-return performer within its sector. Bonds in this category have weak or worsening credit trends, or they may be stable credits that, we believe, are overvalued or rich relative to the sector.

Sell: Indicates a recommended sell on the expectation that the issue will be among the poor performers in its sector.

Restricted: In certain circumstances, Credit Suisse policy and/or applicable law and regulations preclude certain types of communications, including an investment recommendation, during the course of Credit Suisse's engagement in an investment banking transaction and in certain other circumstances.

Not Rated: Credit Suisse Global Credit Research or Global Leveraged Finance Research covers the issuer but currently does not offer an investment view on the subject issue.

Not Covered: Neither Credit Suisse Global Credit Research nor Global Leveraged Finance Research covers the issuer or offers an investment view on the issuer or any securities related to it. Any communication from Research on securities or companies that Credit Suisse does not cover is factual or a reasonable, non-material deduction based on an analysis of publicly available information.

Corporate Bond Risk Category Definitions

In addition to the recommendation, each issue may have a risk category indicating that it is an appropriate holding for an "average" high yield investor, designated as **Market**, or that it has a higher or lower risk profile, designated as **Speculative** and **Conservative**, respectively.

Credit Suisse Credit Rating Definitions

Credit Suisse may assign rating opinions to investment-grade and crossover issuers. Ratings are based on our assessment of a company's creditworthiness and are not recommendations to buy or sell a security. The ratings scale (AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B) is dependent on our assessment of an issuer's ability to meet its financial commitments in a timely manner. Within each category, creditworthiness is further detailed with a scale of High, Mid, or Low – with High being the strongest sub-category rating: **High AAA, Mid AAA, Low AAA** – obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments is extremely strong; **High AA, Mid AA, Low AA** – obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments is very strong; **High A, Mid A, Low A** – obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments is strong; **High BBB, Mid BBB, Low BBB** – obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments is adequate, but adverse economic/operating/financial circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity to meet its obligations; **High BB, Mid BB, Low BB** – obligations have speculative characteristics and are subject to substantial credit risk; **High B, Mid B, Low B** – obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments is very weak and highly vulnerable to adverse economic, operating, and financial circumstances; **High CCC, Mid CCC, Low CCC** – obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments is extremely weak and is dependent on favorable economic, operating, and financial circumstances. Credit Suisse's rating opinions do not necessarily correlate with those of the rating agencies.

References in this report to Credit Suisse include all of the subsidiaries and affiliates of Credit Suisse AG operating under its investment banking division. For more information on our structure, please use the following link: https://www.credit-suisse.com/who_we_are/en/.

This report is not directed to, or intended for distribution to or use by, any person or entity who is a citizen or resident of or located in any locality, state, country or other jurisdiction where such distribution, publication, availability or use would be contrary to law or regulation or which would subject Credit Suisse AG or its affiliates ("CS") to any registration or licensing requirement within such jurisdiction. All material presented in this report, unless specifically indicated otherwise, is under copyright to CS. None of the material, nor its content, nor any copy of it, may be altered in any way, transmitted to, copied or distributed to any other party, without the prior express written permission of CS. All trademarks, service marks and logos used in this report are trademarks or service marks or registered trademarks or service marks of CS or its affiliates.

The information, tools and material presented in this report are provided to you for information purposes only and are not to be used or considered as an offer or the solicitation of an offer to sell or to buy or subscribe for securities or other financial instruments. CS may not have taken any steps to ensure that the securities referred to in this report are suitable for any particular investor. CS will not treat recipients of this report as its customers by virtue of their receiving this report. The investments and services contained or referred to in this report may not be suitable for you and it is recommended that you consult an independent investment advisor if you are in doubt about such investments or investment services. Nothing in this report constitutes investment, legal, accounting or tax advice, or a representation that any investment or strategy is suitable or appropriate to your individual circumstances, or otherwise constitutes a personal recommendation to you. CS does not advise on the tax consequences of investments and you are advised to contact an independent tax adviser. Please note in particular that the bases and levels of taxation may change.

Information and opinions presented in this report have been obtained or derived from sources believed by CS to be reliable, but CS makes no representation as to their accuracy or completeness. CS accepts no liability for loss arising from the use of the material presented in this report, except that this exclusion of liability does not apply to the extent that such liability arises under specific statutes or regulations applicable to CS. This report is not to be relied upon in substitution for the exercise of independent judgment. CS may have issued, and may in the future issue, other reports that are inconsistent with, and reach different conclusions from, the information presented in this report. Those reports reflect the different assumptions, views and analytical methods of the analysts who prepared them and CS is under no obligation to ensure that such other reports are brought to the attention of any recipient of this report.

CS may, to the extent permitted by law, participate or invest in financing transactions with the issuer(s) of the securities referred to in this report, perform services for or solicit business from such issuers, and/or have a position or holding, or other material interest, or effect transactions, in such securities or options thereon, or other investments related thereto. In addition, it may make markets in the securities mentioned in the material presented in this report. CS may have, within the last three years, served as manager or co-manager of a public offering of securities for, or currently may make a primary market in issues of, any or all of the entities mentioned in this report or may be providing, or have provided within the previous 12 months, significant advice or investment services in relation to the investment concerned or a related investment. Additional information is, subject to duties of confidentiality, available on request. Some investments referred to in this report will be offered solely by a single entity and in the case of some investments solely by CS, or an associate of CS or CS may be the only market maker in such investments.

Past performance should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of future performance, and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made regarding future performance. Information, opinions and estimates contained in this report reflect a judgement at its original date of publication by CS and are subject to change without notice. The price, value of and income from any of the securities or financial instruments mentioned in this report can fall as well as rise. The value of securities and financial instruments is subject to exchange rate fluctuation that may have a positive or adverse effect on the price or income of such securities or financial instruments. Investors in securities such as ADR's, the values of which are influenced by currency volatility, effectively assume this risk.

Structured securities are complex instruments, typically involve a high degree of risk and are intended for sale only to sophisticated investors who are capable of understanding and assuming the risks involved. The market value of any structured security may be affected by changes in economic, financial and political factors (including, but not limited to, spot and forward interest and exchange rates), time to maturity, market conditions and volatility, and the credit quality of any issuer or reference issuer. Any investor interested in purchasing a structured product should conduct their own investigation and analysis of the product and consult with their own professional advisers as to the risks involved in making such a purchase.

Some investments discussed in this report may have a high level of volatility. High volatility investments may experience sudden and large falls in their value causing losses when that investment is realised. Those losses may equal your original investment. Indeed, in the case of some investments the potential losses may exceed the amount of initial investment and, in such circumstances, you may be required to pay more money to support those losses. Income yields from investments may fluctuate and, in consequence, initial capital paid to make the investment may be used as part of that income yield. Some investments may not be readily realisable and it may be difficult to sell or realise those investments, similarly it may prove difficult for you to obtain reliable information about the value, or risks, to which such an investment is exposed.

This report may provide the addresses of, or contain hyperlinks to, websites. Except to the extent to which the report refers to website material of CS, CS has not reviewed any such site and takes no responsibility for the content contained therein. Such address or hyperlink (including addresses or hyperlinks to CS's own website material) is provided solely for your convenience and information and the content of any such website does not in any way form part of this document. Accessing such website or following such link through this report or CS's website shall be at your own risk.

This report is issued and distributed in Europe (except Switzerland) by Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited, One Cabot Square, London E14 4QJ, England, which is regulated in the United Kingdom by The Financial Services Authority ("FSA"). This report is being distributed in Germany by Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited Niederlassung Frankfurt am Main regulated by the Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht ("BaFin"). This report is being distributed in the United States and Canada by Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC; in Switzerland by Credit Suisse AG; in Brazil by Banco de Investimentos Credit Suisse (Brasil) S.A.; in Mexico by Banco Credit Suisse (Mexico), S.A. (transactions related to the securities mentioned in this report will only be effected in compliance with applicable regulation); in Japan by Credit Suisse Securities (Japan) Limited, Financial Instruments Firm, Director-General of Kanto Local Finance Bureau (*Kinsho*) No. 66, a member of Japan Securities Dealers Association, The Financial Futures Association of Japan, Japan Securities Investment Advisers Association; elsewhere in Asia/ Pacific by whichever of the following is the appropriately authorised entity in the relevant jurisdiction: Credit Suisse (Hong Kong) Limited, Credit Suisse Equities (Australia) Limited, Credit Suisse Securities (Thailand) Limited, Credit Suisse Securities (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd, Credit Suisse AG, Singapore Branch, and elsewhere in the world by the relevant authorised affiliate of the above. Research on Taiwanese securities produced by Credit Suisse AG, Taipei Branch has been prepared by a registered Senior Business Person. Research provided to residents of Malaysia is authorised by the Head of Research for Credit Suisse Securities (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd, to whom they should direct any queries on +603 2723 2020. This research may not conform to Canadian disclosure requirements.

In jurisdictions where CS is not already registered or licensed to trade in securities, transactions will only be effected in accordance with applicable securities legislation, which will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and may require that the trade be made in accordance with applicable exemptions from registration or licensing requirements. Non-U.S. customers wishing to effect a transaction should contact a CS entity in their local jurisdiction unless governing law permits otherwise. U.S. customers wishing to effect a transaction should do so only by contacting a representative at Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC in the U.S.

This material is not for distribution to retail clients and is directed exclusively at Credit Suisse's market professional and institutional clients. Recipients who are not market professional or institutional investor clients of CS should seek the advice of their independent financial advisor prior to taking any investment decision based on this report or for any necessary explanation of its contents. This research may relate to investments or services of a person outside of the UK or to other matters which are not regulated by the FSA or in respect of which the protections of the FSA for private customers and/or the UK compensation scheme may not be available, and further details as to where this may be the case are available upon request in respect of this report.

Copyright © 2010 CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.

Investment principal on bonds can be eroded depending on sale price or market price. In addition, there are bonds on which investment principal can be eroded due to changes in redemption amounts. Care is required when investing in such instruments.

When you purchase non-listed Japanese fixed income securities (Japanese government bonds, Japanese municipal bonds, Japanese government guaranteed bonds, Japanese corporate bonds) from CS as a seller, you will be requested to pay purchase price only.